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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION__________________ 
1.1 - Research Area 
“Anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their 
harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various 
regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions”. 1 
 
Despite its relative historical anonymity, the Structural and Cohesion 
policy of the European Union is actually a rather long-standing 
phenomenon. The ideology behind the structural and cohesion funds can 
be traced back to the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1960, emphasizing 
the need of such. Still, this was not effectuated until the mid-seventies, 
where the first real steps were taken towards a European model of 
redistribution between regions. 
The first vaguely defined objective of the funds concerned the rapidly 
growing unemployment in the Member States, and though this is still the 
official aim, methods and means have changed over the past thirty years, 
not least in 1985, where the fundamental shaping of funds took place, 
which is clear if we cast a sidelong glance at the increasing budgets 
(Wallace, 2005:215). 
Over the past centuries, there have been a changing number of objectives 
focusing on different aspects of the regional policy. Today, it remains a 
highly complex policy-area embracing many different aspects under three 
main objectives (Wallace, 2005:228), which define the overall goal of the 
structural and cohesion policy: The focus of the funds is to develop and 
support regions that are lagging behind in terms of development, to 
                                                 
1 EC-Treaty Preamble, 1999 
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support conversion in areas facing structural problems, and to contribute 
to the adoption and modernisation of policies and systems of education 
(Commission, 2003:xxvii). The tendency regarding the objectives is, that 
they have been simplified and they will be further reduced under the next 
budget period starting in 2007 (Wallace, 2005:228). However, the third 
objective will focus explicitly on territorial cohesion, integrating the 
current interregional cooperation.  
These objectives are not the only part of the policy area undergoing 
substantial change throughout history. The size of the budget has 
increased - and by that also the size of the amount that are canalised into 
the funds - from humble 257 million € in 1975 to 38.791 billion € in 20062. 
In percentages, the item of the Structural funds on the overall budget has 
raised from 4.8% in 1975 to 32% in 2006, which may be seen as an 
expressive reflection of the growing importance added to this area in the 
further development of the Community project (Wallace, 2001:584). 
Of equal importance is the territorial redistributive aspect. Structural 
Funds are the only financial instrument by which money can be 
reallocated from richer to poorer regions – a fact that has received 
increasing attention, especially in the light of the latest enlargement 
towards the East, where the Union grew from 15 to 25 member states and 
the population hereby significantly increased. (Wallace, 2005:232) 
This fundamental presentation depicts an altogether generous and 
intentionally well-meaning undertaking enacted in and by the European 
Union. But should this seemingly kind-heartedness of the project be 
interpreted as a sign of consent and unity, or is it fair to assume that 
                                                 
2 Peterson, 1999: 149, Wallace, 2005:     
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beneath the calm surface lies a complex and widely disputed game of 
pursuing national interests? 
 
The funds were created with the purpose of equalizing disparities 
between the regions in Europe, and by that between the Europeans. In the 
light of this, the way that the funds are administrated is questionable; only 
one percent of the budget remains available for Community Initiatives, 
while the rest is dispersed on a basis of national implementation 
(Richardson, 2004:250). However, around 80 % of funds distributed are 
aimed at regions with a GDP per capita below 75 % of the Community 
average. This structure only might seem questionable. Despite the fact that 
member states do not necessarily see things in the macro perspective, and 
thereby promote their national perspectives at the expense of the common 
good, some basic principles of redistribution seem to work. 
 
Taking into account that regional policy concerns no less than one third 
the overall European budget (34,4% (Moussis, 2005:38)), endless 
negotiations on the budget and the distribution of Structural Funds seem 
logic, as the prospect for a member state of obtaining capital is both easy 
and evident. No member state possesses inexhaustible economic resources 
or goodwill towards the European project; therefore it is likely to assume 
that this re-allocative procedure has losers and winners, with interests in 
either preserving or changing their current position, constantly judging 
whether they are net-receivers or net-losers.  
It is assumable, that the complexity of problems in these negotiations has 
only increased with the latest enlargement, because the mass of net-
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receivers has increased significantly and by that made the strife equally 
more intense.  
Another aspect is that the accession of ten new member states meant an 
increase in the aggregated population of the Union and a growing 
economic disparity among regions of the EU, never experienced before in 
its 50-year history. Given the economic and political state of these new 
(relatively poor) member states, how can the adaptation of a maximum 
limit, effectively preventing the new member states of receiving more than 
four percent of their GNP be explained? 
The formal thought behind the cohesion policy is in itself very ideological; 
money is transferred from the richer to the poorer regions, with the aim of 
creating a better future for a common Europe.3  
It seems relevant to ask the question whether the development of the 
funds is driven by preferences of member states, or whether an overall 
ideology is shaping the agenda?  
Is the purpose of the Structural Funds to support regions, that do not have 
the required economic and institutional basis for participating in the 
framework that is set up with the increasing number of policy areas, that 
EU influences today? An obvious example of this situation is the Single 
European Market, where some regions are in no position to make use of 
the possibilities that are set up.  
Or are the Structural Funds rather in a constant process of transformation, 
reflecting the ever-changing agenda in the EU, in the attempt to meet 
future challenges? 
This project will emanate from this overall discussion, and try to clarify 
why Structural Funds have developed as they have, and what underlying 
                                                 
3 Treaty of the European Union 
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motive there is for their continuous development. Another aspect that will 
be considered is how the assumed inter-institutional battle in the Union, 
between the EU-institutions4, affects the conditions for the funds and the 
general policy governing them. 
1.2 – Problem formulation 
On this background the following question can be formulated: 
How do institutional arrangements affect the development of EU’s 
regional policy, and what are its future prospects? 
 
1.2.1 – Clarifying the problem formulation  
A: The formal EU-Institutions 
The Council, the Commission and the Member States are examples of the 
concept of ‘EU-institutions’. Hereby, when speaking of institutional 
influences, we refer to the inter-institutional relations relevant when 
examining the development over time of the Regional Policy. 
 
B: The theoretical concept of institutions 
In the more abstract perception of institutions, they are seen as social 
structures consisting of rules, values and norms affecting the behaviour of 
the actors inside. ‘Institutional influences’ thereby raise questions of the 
mutually influential relations between actors and institutions. 
 
EU’s regional policy can be studied at different level but we are focusing 
on what we label as the systemic level, which is further explained in the 
following methodological chapter. 
                                                 
4 The Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. 
 11
1.3 – An Introduction to the Structural Funds  
Knowing that the Structural Funds not are belongs to the most promoted 
policy area within the scope of the European Union. The following section 
is presenting a short and general introduction to the regional policy in 
order to make this policy comprehensible to the reader. The introduction 
will consist of general facts concerning the operation and distribution of 
funds. 
 
Regional policy refers to a set of activities designed to reduce economic 
and social disparities and promote a more even pattern of economic 
development across the European Union (Hooghe, 1996: 3 and Tarschys, 
2000: 29). The policy contains some impressive figures: The budgetary 
share set aside for the regional policy in the current period (2000-2006) 
accounts for approximately 0, 46 % of the community’s yearly GDP, 
administered through a highly specialised and complex bureaucratic 
system, which involves EU, national and regional officials. The funds 
sustaining the regional policy are organized in five ‘funds’, each created in 
order to address specific topics5. The term funds should be taken with a 
pinch of salt, as none of the funds possesses any available capital of their 
own, but are financed through the common budget. Today, three 
objectives configure the distribution of the funds, though this change has 
only recently occurred (Tarschys, 2000: 17). 
 
 
                                                 
5 European Regional Development Fund (ERDF, 1975), European Social Fund (ESF, 1960), 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF, 1962), Cohesion Fund 
(1991) and The financial instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG,1993) Other 
instruments include the European investmentbank (EIB) and the instrument for 
structural policies for Pre-Accession. Tarschys, 2000: 17-18 and Heinelt, 1996: 47-50 
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Priority regions 
The Community regional policy primarily recognises two main types of 
priority regions 1) regions whose development is lagging behind6 and 2) 
regions facing structural difficulties7. The identification of regions is based 
on the common system of classification of the regions the “Nomenclature 
of Territorial Statistical Units (NUTS)” developed by the Statistical Office 
of the European Communities in cooperation with the national institutes 
for statistics. The non-administrative units correspond to comparable 
economic, social, geographical and environmental circumstances. These 
two objectives occupy most of the financial means, but according to article 
159 (TEU) the five Funds should participate in a coordinated way to 
achieve the objective of the economic and social cohesion in the 
Community. For this the general regulation (1260/1999) for the Funds lays 
down three priority objectives (for the period 2000-2006) which are 
illustrated below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Objective 1 regions 
7 Objective 2 regions 
Objective 1 promotes the development and structural adjustment of regions whose 
development is lagging behind, i.e. average per capita below 75% of Community 
average, through ERDF, ESF, EAGGF-Guidance and FIFG. Almost 70 % of total 
funding reserved for objective 1 regions and should benefit almost 20 % of total EU 
population. 
Objective 2 supports, through all four Structural Funds, the economic and social 
conversion of areas facing structural difficulties and in particular areas which undergoes 
socio-economic change in the industrial and service sectors, declining rural areas, urban 
areas in difficulty and depressed areas dependent on fisheries. 11.5 % of the funding goes 
to these regions, which account for some 18 % of the Union’s population  
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Coordination of Community policies 
The general regulations8 on the Structural Funds specifies that the 
Commission and the Member States must ensure that the operations of the 
Funds are consistent with other Community policies, as many common 
policies by their nature favour the process of integration and cohesion. 
Especially the common social policy (CSP) plays an important role on 
labour law, free movement of workers, and equal opportunities for men 
and women in poor regions.  
 
Community Initiatives 
Outside the nationally (financially) underpinned  development plans 
(CSFs and SDPs), the Structural Funds support Community Initiatives 
which are transnational programmes that aim to resolve problems that 
have a particular relevance for the Community. Though the initiatives are 
drawn up by local, national and Community authorities, they are carried 
out on the initiative of the Commission and are meant to supplement the 
programmes under the three Objectives, and promoting a cross-border, 
trans-national and interregional cooperation in the context of equal 
opportunities for all relevant regions.  
                                                 
8 Regulation 1260/1999 and Regulation 1105/2003 
Objective 3 contributes to the adaptation and modernisation of policies and systems of 
education, training and employment outside the regions covered by Objective 1. 
Objektive 3 is the reference framework for the measures taken under the Title of 
employment in the EC Treaty and under the European employment Strategy. The EFS 
alone is responsible for the funding which amounts to 12% of overall funding budget.  
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The increasing budget 
To illustrate the increasing attention given to the funds since their origin is 
the below drawn model9 included, which shows the amount of money 
canalised into the Structural Funds from 1988 until today. 
 
 
 
 
On the background of the introduction to our area of interest, our problem 
formulation, which will be answered in the conclusion as well as to what 
the regional policy in fact encompasses, we will in the following chapter 
present the overall research method and the designed structure of the rest 
of the project.  
                                                 
9 Christian Tuschoff, 2001 
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CHAPTER 2 – OVERALL METHODOLOGY_______ 
 
This chapter will introduce our main methodological approach by 
describing our goals, their extent and validity and how they are to be 
obtained in terms of research strategy and deploying of theoretical tools, 
hopefully giving a clear understanding of how a final conclusion will be 
reached. 
2.1 – Introduction 
This inquiry into European structural policy was founded on a basic 
interest in European politics and a curiosity concerning the apparent 
discrepancy between idealistic and optimistic political objectives of the 
Union concerning structural policy and the outcome of it not fully 
reflecting the political reality, as suggested in the introduction. 
The European structural policy constitutes an intriguing and inexplicable 
phenomenon in its present form. In recognizing this, we have decided to 
examine how this arrangement has evolved, implying the use of a research 
design capable of handling historical processes. The initial probing results 
of identifying adequate theoretical explanations, which could contribute to 
explaining these affairs, turned out to be unrewarding, as much of the 
existing academic literature concerning structural policy simply held that 
this matter was best understood in the terms of side-payments, meaning 
that this policy field is subordinate to an intergovernmental logic.10 While 
this project should not be considered as a definite criticism of this 
interpretation, it is still important to mention this aspect, as it set off our 
interest in adopting a more nuanced view of the development of structural 
                                                 
10 Wallace, 2005:213; Tarschys, 2000:48; and Peterson, 1999:149 
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policy in order to advance a qualified assessment of its further course. This 
includes an assessment of the influence of both formal supranational 
influence and informal institutional impacts, constraining and shaping the 
behaviour of the executing actors. 
Throughout the project, this historical institutionalism will assume the 
function of theoretical framework providing the necessary basic 
ontological understanding of the research area, such as the effect of the 
relationship between ideas and actors and one the hand and temporal- 
and causal processes on the other hand.  
In addition to this, the approach of historical institutionalism will act as a 
mediator between two additional sub-theories, in order to determine the 
historical course. 
 
Finally, we will apply the concept of path dependency, a key concept in 
historical institutionalism, which will be used to gauge the stability of the 
institutional arrangements in focus. The rest of this chapter examines in 
detail the empirical and theoretical concepts employed in this project. 
 
 
We have chosen to set up a decentralized methodological structure, which 
involves separate minor methodological discussions throughout the 
project, deployed when relevant and when having a topical significance 
(c.f. 3.5). By doing this, we hope to secure the overall logic, by frequently 
being forced to justify the choices made. A figure at the end of this chapter 
specifies the exact positions of these sections. The decision of deploying 
the methodological clarification scattered all over the project may seem 
confusing and inconsistent, but we felt that placing the methodological 
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discussions én bloc would result in one enormous, baffling monolog, 
causing the reader to forget half of its content before he reached its end. 
Therefore this chapter should provide only the most basic information in 
order to give the reader the necessary breadth of view. 
 
The project represents the final result of longer process in which both 
scope and strategy has shifted as the inquisition proceeded. From a 
philosophic interest in learning in and between institutions to European 
integration theory – there has certainly been no shortage of theoretical 
approaches available. Likewise, the empirical domain has offered a rich 
variety of cases and fascinating complexes of problems; from studying the 
problems caused by the recent enlargement to focusing more narrowly on 
the implementation of a single project. Nevertheless, with an only a fixed 
set of pages at our disposal, choices have had to be made. Therefore this 
project is foremost engaged with describing the development of a certain 
policy area over a broad range of years and the historical events and actors 
appearing chosen by virtue of their relationship to the regional policy. 
This choice made, due to practical considerations, narrows the scope of 
variables, hopefully without ruining the validity of the results.  
2.2 – Why choose institutionalism as approach? 
As announced in the introduction, institutionalism constitutes an 
important part of this project. The decision of using historical 
institutionalism requires a more elaborate justification and clarification. By 
using historical institutionalism as our major theoretical framework, we 
hope to gain a more detailed description than currently available, of the 
organizational interplay that shapes the structural policy area of the 
Union. The focus will be on the actors and institutions involved, their 
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preferences and visions, and in what ways these aggregated and 
presumably conflicting ideas are transformed into policy. A fundamental 
ontological assumption, shared by all (new) institutionalisms is that 
institutions influence the political outcome, by acting as a sort of filters. 
This is also where consent between the new institutionalisms end, as the 
question of how institutions matter differs greatly between the competing 
schools of institutionalisms. (Peters, 2005: 6-11 and Wiener, 2003:137) 
In this project we hope to find out in which way institutions matter, and 
how they affect the policy outcome. The institutional aspect of European 
politics requires some consideration. According to Sandholtz:  
 
“The fact that many (or most) EU decisions look like interstate bargains … tells 
us nothing about how the institutional context shapes preferences and EU 
decision making” (Peterson, 1999, p.16).  
 
Institutionalism is primarily interested in going beyond the formal roles 
and legal powers of executive actors, by focusing on how they are 
influenced by the contextual settings like norms, values and ideas 
(Pierson, 2001:16).  
 
The influence of institutions becomes relevant, as the actors appearing in 
this project act inside or on behalf of the institutions of the European 
Union.  
The following statements stress the necessity of studying the institutions:  
- The European institutions are comparatively young and 
thereby constantly experimenting, constantly sparking tensions as a result 
of their dynamic interaction. Formal national institutions have usually 
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developed over a long time, increasing the probability of a state of 
equilibrium. 
- As opposed to traditional institutions in the member states, 
these institutions posses legal rational authority in the form of sovereignty 
vested in them by its members. This autonomy, which is accrued over 
time, deriving from the acquis communautaire is given with the purpose 
of guarding the integrity of the enormous interdependency binding the 
member states together.  
- Some might say that institutions are simple vehicles, 
guardians of intergovernmental settlements, but the constantly changing 
political environment surrounding these institutions forces them to adapt 
to new situations by rearticulating their own role and purpose (Peterson & 
Shackleton, 2004:7-11, own interpretation). 
- Finally; EU politics are largely a product of competition 
between its institutions, which are profoundly and inescapably 
interdependent. The EU decision rules are designed to foster collective 
responsibility and little of importance can be decided without the joint 
consent of the Commission, Parliament and Council. (Peterson & 
Bomberg, 1999:31-45) 
 
2.3 – Considerations regarding research strategy 
Epistemological considerations concerning the method for answering the 
research question has led to the adoption of a research strategy primarily 
preoccupied with the inter-institutional policy formation on the systemic 
level (illustrated below)11, in order to address the relevant problems on a 
corresponding theoretical level. The figure below should only be 
                                                 
11 Peterson, 1999:9 
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interpreted as a hint about the nature of this project, illustrating our 
interest in decision-making as a product of inter-institutional relations. 
 
  Level  Decisions taken Bargaining mode Rationality 
Super 
systemic 
History-making Intergovernment
al 
Political  
Systemic Policy setting Institutional Political./Technical 
Sub systemic Policy shaping Resource-
exchanging 
Technical/Consens
ual 
 
As illustrated below, the theoretical approach of the analysis will have a 
central role in investigating the development of the policy field in 
question. This is due to an historical institutionalist choice of perspective, 
determining certain ways of addressing the problems of interest. Our 
main theoretical approach will consist of an overarching (historical 
institutionalist) framework, encompassing both rational choice- and 
sociological concepts. The purpose of introducing a dualistic institutional 
model is due to the acknowledgement of the strength and weaknesses 
found in each of these approaches, when applied separately. The two sub-
theories will be further elaborated in chapter four, along with various 
relevant concepts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ’75 
 
 
 
 
 
     ’89 
 
 
 
 
     
      ’Today 
 
 
 
RCI 
 
 
 
SI 
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The figure above illustrates the relationship between the two applied analyses. 
Due to their different perspectives, understood as their analytical explanatory 
strength, they emphasises different aspects of the policy in question. Despite of 
this, they tend to overlap in two different senses: First there is a temporal overlap, 
exemplified in the figure above, though the figure is only illustrative. Second 
there is a analytical overlap, as the theories identifies stable elements in the 
regional policy, which will form the basis of the discussion whether elements in 
this policy can be termed path dependent (Will be further explained in chapter 
four).  
 
The justification for employing two very different aspects of historical 
institutionalism, beside the gains of interdisciplinary in terms of greater 
certainty for the results of the analysis, is that we wish to focus on the 
following two aspects in our historical analysis. 
A) The structural funds is a result of more than 30 years of European 
cooperation, therefore one main analytical task consists in composing a 
basic historical understanding of the past institutional development in 
order to determine the events and choices sustaining its present form. This 
analysis will determine how the initial creation of the structural funds has 
influenced its further course, focusing on how institutional rules and 
values may alter the behaviour of rational actors, though driven by a 
strategic calculus are put in a joint decision trap (Hall, 1996:12-14) 
B) The second analysis will take a cultural approach, emphasising how 
ideas may structure and frame the choices available to the executing 
actors, again in a historical context. Inspired by constructivist theory the 
analysis deals with the meanings, norms and values constituting the 
institution, in order to asses the effects of shifting and interacting 
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paradigms, decisive to past, present and future policy outcomes (Hall, 
1996:15-17). 
The two analyses are complementary, and the combined result of their 
findings will be used in the concluding discussion, relating to path 
dependency. 
2.4 – Generating empirical data 
Having decided that our theoretical approach should mainly regard the 
European institutions, we are left with an important issue of how to 
generate the relevant empirical data, a subject we will now address. In our 
search for usable sources of data, two problems have proven immanent in 
relation to our research agenda, each linked to the use of different sources 
of data. Both types of data will be used in the project, though with certain 
reservations. 
The official documents, stemming directly from the EU institutions have 
the sufficient authentic character to be accepted primary sources, as they 
give a comprehensive description of the structural policy in its past and 
present state. However, the main problem associated with this type of 
official documents is that they are subordinate to the logic of a political 
consistency that impedes any critical approach, as conflicting elements 
within the policy area are carefully excluded or minimized in order to 
preserve the image of an overall (political) stability and consensus12. 
Another source, normally recognised by scholars would be the use of 
academic publications as secondary empirical data. We find this source 
equally problematic, though for other reasons. This type of inadequacy is 
                                                 
12 E.g. “Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion”, 2003 – This report pictures an 
overall harmonious and detailed description of the regional policy, but is a poor guide if 
ones interest is to expose the underlying political motives. 
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more subtle, but nonetheless problematic. While several researchers 
choose to incorporate structural policy into their research, hardly any texts 
dedicate themselves solely to the empirical ontology of this policy area.13 If 
we were forced to use this source only, the sporadic and selective nature 
of this literature would have severe implication for the validity of the 
conclusion. 
These observations have lead to two principal decisions; the general 
approach must be historical and continual in order to determine the 
events as they unfold over time. Different scientific approaches take off 
from different historical events, making sound comparative analysis 
elusive and tricky, as major causal relations can be disputed – empirical 
evidence may support a theory, but at the same time, other sources may 
disprove it. Therefore a key component of this assignment will consist in 
constructing the empirical foundation upon which the question of 
research can be resolved. A more comprehensive explanation of how to 
systematically conduct this groundwork will appear in chapter three.  
The second decision is to emphasize the gathering of pure undigested 
data, not interpreted to fit in some greater scheme. One way of ensuring 
this is to conduct interviews with persons who are in profession related to 
this policy area. This allows us to control to some extent and to at least be 
aware of how each statement or answer relates itself to its context. It also 
opens up the possibility of getting hold of the latest and most relevant 
empirical evidence, a task that otherwise might prove to be impossible, or 
at least very difficult, and require mind-numbing and not very safe 
                                                 
13 One gets the impression that despite being a highly contested subject, structural policy 
serves only as a secondary case example, inferior to grander theory of the author himself 
(e.g. Andrew Moravcsik, 1993 or Gary Marks, 1993) 
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reliance on secondary sources like newspapers and internet sites (or those 
mentioned above). 
A main source will therefore be obtained through a number of research 
interviews with officials from the European Commission and the 
European Council. The interviews have been conducted in Brussels and 
will represent a base of up-to-date knowledge of the problems in the field 
of structural and cohesion policy, and they will appear as quotes or 
references in the analysis. A methodological discussion of scope, relevance 
and implication of these interviews will also be presented in chapter three.  
 
2.5 – Methodological considerations 
Historical Institutionalism is a category including a broad range of 
subdivisions, each engaged in different and widely dispersed topics, but 
united in the shared emphasis of institutions as the appropriate unit of 
research, the rejection of the functionalist logic of behaviourism as well as 
the ontological assumptions made by rational choice theorists about the 
strategic, calculating behaviour of actors in policymaking (Pierson & 
Skocpol, 1996:2-4).  
Historical institutionalists define institutions as the formal or informal 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organizational structure of the polity. (Peters, 2005: 6)  
The Problem formulation emanates from these institutional arrangements 
and it is therefore appropriate to examine it from an historical institutionalist 
perspective.  
After the problem formulation and what follows to that (the elaboration of 
the research area. 1.1) were defined, the next step was to have some 
methodological considerations. In this phase we chose the research 
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strategy, which led to first of all the theoretical approach and the empirical 
data, in form of interviews supplemented by historical reviews. 
This result in two further steps; Firstly, the institutionalist theory was 
divided in the sub-theories of RCI and SI, to provide the conclusion with a 
broader and more nuance perspective. The actors and institutions are 
perceived as being shaped in a complex web of ideas and policies, in 
which the different theories can give a complementing explanation, 
through their adverse and different assumptions of this relationship, 
providing us with a detailed historical and institutionalistic survey. 
Secondly, an important issue related to the development of the regional 
policy is the matter of stability. To identify to how extent the evolution has 
been stable, we decided to introduce the concept of path-dependency as a 
concept that combines and unites the results of the respective individual 
analysis in a historical institutionalist mode. 
Before the theories could be applied in the analysis, they were 
operationalized, in order to apply to our research area and methodology. 
We aimed to create a common basis to the understanding of the logic’s 
and dynamics in the institutions and the limit and extent of their 
explanatory power, and thus the validity of our conclusion. 
A graphic reproduction of the above mentioned clarification can be found in 
the end of this chapter (Project design (2.7)). 
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2.6 – Revising the Chapters 
The following section serves to create an overview of the different 
chapters in the project and their content. 
 
C
H
A
PT
ER
 1
 
Introduction: 
Presenting the overall considerations in the field of 
research, starting with a general introduction of the 
problematics, underlying this project and our motivation 
for focusing at the Structural Funds and the regional policy 
in the EU. This is followed by the problem formulation. 
Chapter 1 ends a general introduction to the regional policy. 
C
H
A
PT
ER
 2
 
Overall Method: 
In this chapter is the introductory methodological 
considerations presented. The structure and design of the 
project is elaborated, and subsequently the choice of theory 
and the selection of the empirical research. This explains the 
connection between the problem formulation and the 
conclusion. The chapter ends with a graphical presentation 
of the project design. 
C
H
A
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ER
 3
 
 
Interviews and Methodology 
This chapter seeks to explain how the empirical data was 
generated (primarily by conducting interviews), processed 
and how this knowledge is used in the project. Finally we 
explain how the statements from the interviewees are 
related to the different part-analysis described. 
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Theoretical approach 
This chapter is providing an overall introduction to the 
theoretical approach. The historical institutionalism is 
introduced together with the two sub-categories; rational 
choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. 
The chapter is aiming to extract the central concepts from 
the theories, used in the analysis. 
C
H
A
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 5
 
The understanding of institutions 
Chapter 5 is a presentation of how the theoretical concepts, 
presented in the foregoing chapter, are connected to 
preferences and institutions and how institutions are 
viewed through the different theories, as well as how actors 
are behaving within institutions. The overall purpose of the 
chapter could be described as a pre-amble to the analysis. 
C
H
A
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RCI Analysis 
Chapter 6 constitutes the first part-analysis, which will be 
conducted from the calculus-approach inspired by Lindner 
and Rittberger. The chapter is split in two parts related to 
historical periods, presented in a creation and an operation 
phase, each closed by a summarising analysis.  
C
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 SI Analysis 
This chapter presents the sociological approach, 
constituting our cultural perspective on the institutional 
development, occupied in explaining the various paradigms 
and ideas sustaining the logic in this policy area. 
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 HI Analysis and Path-Dependence 
Having harvested valuable results in the previous two 
chapters, we return to our main theory in order to give a 
qualified assessment of the regional policy in terms of past, 
present and future state. 
C
H
A
PT
ER
 9
 Conclusion 
The result of the project and answer to our problem 
formulation. In addition to an answer, we wish to evaluate 
our research approach retrospectively 
 
On the basis of the above-mentioned considerations and the presentation 
of the methodological approach, is the processing regarding to the 
interviews, presented in the next chapter following the project design. 
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CHAPTER 3 – INTERVIEWS AND METHOD______ 
 
The bulk part of the empirical research in the project revolves around five 
qualitative interviews with EU officials, working within the Council and 
the Commission. They play an important role in the methodological 
approaches, on various levels in the project, in order to meet a number of 
different intermediate objectives in the project on the theoretical, analytical 
and empirical level. This will be elaborated in the following sections. 
The five interviews were all conducted in Brussels in the preparatory 
phase of the project. The methodology of conducting and processing of the 
interviews is presented in its five phases as well as an introduction to our 
interviewees and their background. Thirdly, the role and purpose of the 
interviews in defining our research domain is discussed, and last but not 
least, the validity of the overall legitimacy use of the interviews is 
defended and contested. 
 
3.1 – Conducting and processing: The five phases  
 
Phase 1: Preparatory empirical research 
Being aware of the deterministic potential a series of interview questions 
has on the nature and validity of the responses, a lot of energy has been 
put into the preparation of the interview guide used for the interviews. 
First of all, historical knowledge as well as knowledge about the current 
status of the Structural Policy has been acquired through literature review 
of various teaching books and research papers. This granted an initial 
overview over the field of interest. Secondly, an external source was 
consulted, advising on absolute current topics and issues, which are 
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almost non-accessible otherwise, as well as to the choice of the 
interviewees suitable for the project’s area of interest, which will be 
elaborated further in this chapter. This external source, Peter Mehlbye, is 
the director of the European Spatial Planning Observation Network 
(ESPON), conducting applied research and studies on regional and spatial 
disparities in development within the European territory, thus being 
closely connected in his daily work to DG Regio and the member states 
representatives in the Council within the regional policy.    
 
Phase 2 - The interview guide 
In continuation of the extensive appropriation of background knowledge 
(historical and current issues), one primary objective of the guide was to 
create some continuity in the interviews, by giving the interview persons 
carefully related questions despite of their respective different areas of 
specialization and background. The guide was carefully methodically 
prepared with the purpose to guide the interviewees to talk about more 
than the official institutional or national opinions (personal opinions), 
whilst leaving scope for them to introduce issues or topics untouched 
upon by the interview guide. The character and sequencing of the 
questions were meticulously considered with the purpose to capture the 
interview persons interpretation of terms like ideology or their perception 
of which interest conflicts and historical or current events or decisions that 
have had major impact on the development of European regional policy.   
 
Phase 3 – The course of the interviews 
A few weeks before the actual interviews, the interviewees received by 
email a brief synopsis on the problem area of the project including a short 
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presentation of us. This was meant as an ‘informative appetizer’ without 
being too revealing considering the ensuing treatment of the interviews 
and their role in the project.  
 
Each interview started with a dialog on their professional background, 
potential request for anonymity and a presentation by the interviewers on 
the course of the interview. The division of roles between the interviewers 
was as follows: there was one primary interviewer, one ancillary/co-
interviewer and two people focussing on noting quotes and statements 
during the interview. The actual course of interviewing was deliberately 
characterized by being a ‘dialogue based in-process interpretation’ of 
statements, to better be able to spot differences in the different perceptions 
of the same terms in the further treatment of the interviews. This is linked 
to the thoughts behind the interview guide, explained in the first and 
second phase. The time used for each interview was 60-90 minutes. In the 
course between the individual interviews, a learning process took place, 
allowing for re-considerations of the interview guide for the following 
interviewees, taking their professional situation into consideration. 
 
Phase 4 – The transcription  
None of the interview persons rejected the idea of being recorded on tape, 
with the purpose of transcribing the interviews in the full length 
afterwards. However, two interviewees wished to appear anonymous, 
which of course was respected in both the transcription and references 
made afterwards in the project. The transcribed interviews are attached as 
appendix X on a CD-ROM. 
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Phase 5 – Independent processing of the interviews 
The interviews were primarily guided by the interview guide, though 
containing some new topics, unforeseen by the guide. It was clear that the 
interviewees had some different approaches to the questions posed, thus 
showing interest on aspects of the guide, and expressing different 
perceptions of different issues in the interview guide. To systematize these 
different voices of what the Regional Policy is, why it was created and how 
it has evolved and many more issues, a scheme structured by the topics 
touched upon by the guide, was made. This was a lengthy and detailed 
scrutiny of approximately 80 pages of transcribed interviews. One of the 
distinctive characteristics of this processing of the raw interview material 
is that, in the qualitative systemization, independent interpretations of 
meanings beyond the actual statements were included. This was done 
with utmost discretion, not altering the meaning of the statements, merely 
enhancing certain points, thus, facilitating the use of the interviews as a 
whether vane, weighing the current ambiance around the current status of 
the Regional Policy. This point will be elaborated below, in ‘The role of the 
interviews’. This scheme is attached as appendix B. 
 
3.2 – About the interview persons and their institutional 
position 
As mentioned above, the interview persons represent different 
institutions, The Council – the Danish Permanent Representation, the 
Austrian Permanent Representation (having the EU chairmanship at the 
time of the interview); the Commission – DG REGIO. The two contributors 
from the Danish Permanent Representation wanted to be anonymous and 
are therefore neither quoted nor referred to by name. 
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The Danish Permanent Representation: 
- DK 1: Dispatched from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
- DK 2: Dispatched from the Danish Ministry of Finance.  
DK 1 and 2 were chosen because of their professional expertise within the 
daily work on the Structural Funds legislation and budgetary 
negotiations. They were expected to contribute with information on the 
conditions at the ‘intergovernmental and grand bargains’ as well as to 
paint a picture of the general (and sometimes specific) groupings among 
the member states. Last but not least, they were expected to give an idea of 
the daily communication between the national Representations and the 
Commission.  
 
The Austrian Permanent Representation 
- Johannes ROSSBACHER is a counsellor, seated in the 
permanent Austrian Representation in Brussels, which currently holds the 
Presidency of the Union. He is chairing the working group in the 
European Council, dealing with the implementation and development of 
the programmes in the Structural Funds. Professionally, taking up the 
Austrian role as Presidency, he is required to prioritize the Union’s 
interest as a whole above pure Austrian interests. The reflection of this in 
the interview can of course be contested. Moreover, he has a vast amount 
of experience working with the Structural Funds. 
 
DG REGIO, The Commission:  
- Michel-Eric DUFEIL is the Head of DG REGIO E.1, the 
German unit in the DG REGIO. By his role as Head of the German desk, 
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he works mainly on the concrete implementation of the policy in the case 
of Germany. However, he has a long experience with policy-making 
within DG Regio. He caught our interest initially by being described as 
very passionate, qualified and realistic about his work with the Structural 
Funds.  
  
- Nicola de MICHELIS is the Deputy Head of Unit, DG REGIO 
B2, working with the coordination, planning and reforming of the 
Cohesion policy, with the conception and analysing of the Solidarity 
Fund, and is also involved in the accession negotiations. He is currently 
centrally placed in the negotiation on Structural Funds 2006-2013. He can 
be characterized by being relatively critical towards the future direction of 
Regional Policy, and sees the policy-making method used as one of the 
major problems for the future. He works right below and very close with 
Deputy General Director Mr. Leygues, who is one of the “key policy 
thinkers” in DG REGIO and with a long carrier in the Commission.   
 
Overall all five officials have been selected for their professional and 
central positions and exceptional experience within relevant areas. 
 
3.2.1 – Selective criteria  
In the selection (or preparatory) phase (phase 2 of the conducting and 
processing of the interviews) there have been different criteria that we 
wanted to fulfil by interviewing exactly the people we had access to. 
 
- Pursuant to our quest to broaden our knowledge of the 
Structural Funds further, it was important to talk to people 
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with a vast experience and historical knowledge. Especially 
the two persons from the DG REGIO have been in the EU-
system for a long time, and were thus able to contribute with a 
detailed historical view, and more importantly personal 
perceptions of the ambiances and moods at specific moments 
and over time. Something being hard to capture from 
secondary sources. The validity and success of this objective 
will be contested below.  
- Another reason for the selection of officials, was the desire to 
have the two main European institutions represented; the 
Commission and the Council. In connection to the institutional 
selection, the main criteria to concentrate on people which had 
the Structural Funds as a part of their daily work. From the 
Council, we spoke with two Danish representatives from the 
Permanent Danish Representation in the EU.  
- Thirdly, our external source from ESPON, characterised Mr. 
de Michelis as being very central, however, somehow sceptical 
towards the development of the policy, and Mr. Dufeil as 
being a “true European” and basically supportive to 
development and purpose of the policy, thus being able to 
grant us different perceptions about the conflicting policy 
ideas over time and to generate assumptions on where the 
regional policy is heading in the future. 
 
3.3 – The role of the interviews 
The role of the interviews 
 37
Above all, our actual 6-days trip to Brussels with the purpose of 
conducting the five interviews must be assigned its entitled importance 
for the quality of our empirical background. By the autonomous 
interview-processing (phase 5), producing the bulk part of our empirical 
material, we strive to circumvent, the otherwise inevitable historical or 
theoretical pre-given normative assumptions in the empirical weight from 
books, working papers and the like. Hereby not claiming that we prevent 
any external bias, merely limiting the impact of irrelevant theoretical and 
historical prejudice. Additionally, the personal aspect of interviews does 
not limit the communication to speech, but allows us to interpret on 
gesturing and mimic.      
 
Having said that, the interviews serve as mentioned, the following 
different purposes in the project:  
 
 
An informative purpose 
First of all, they do constitute an informative background for us, not to be 
understood as if we build our empirical knowledge exclusively on their 
statements, but more as a specification or elaboration of central issues, that 
we have recognised in our introductory reading on the Structural Funds. 
They generate a value added, in their ability contribute to and describe 
current conflicts or problem areas, that would otherwise be out of our 
reach, due both to the limited amount of written literature in this field and 
to the actuality of the projects problem area. Likewise, the qualitative 
schematization of the interview statements reassures the validity of our 
focus of our problem formulation.  
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This aspect of the role of the interviews can be said to expand our horizon 
of knowledge. 
 
Structuring our research domain 
In continuation of the informative function the interviews are also used as 
an integrated part of our empirical research. The fact that the interview 
persons represent different institutions, gives us an impression of some of 
the institutional conflicts that exists within the Union. The interview 
persons’ statements help defining and maybe narrowing in the research 
domain by defining the central issues and events over time up till today. 
Our schematization (appendix B) of the transcribed interviews (Appendix 
X) is a result of this process, and is the primary empirical basis for the 
analyses. This first-hand, theory-lacking treatment of a vast morass of 
history and politics, finds its justification in the professional positions of 
the interviewees (and thus their expected knowledge and experience). 
This analytical purpose has, contradictory to the other purpose, a clarifying 
effect, helping us draw a path of events over time, our research area, 
which will prevail empirically in the analysis. 
 
With the encompassing use of the schematization of the interviews, we 
argue that the interviews create the settings for our research area, knitting 
together bits stemming from their perceptions, based on the synopsis they 
received in advance of the interview and the interview guide. This 
research area is naturally not complete or satisfactory in fulfilling its 
purpose as the empirical basis for the analysis. Therefore it is 
complemented by secondary material in form of Commission’s reports, 
historical and teaching books.  
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Interviews in the analysis 
As to where the empirical data from the interviews appear in the project, 
they are primarily integrated into the two part-analyses (chapter 6 + 7). 
However, due to the very different methodological approaches, the two 
analyses take advantage of the schematized interview material in two 
different ways. In the rational-choice / historical analysis, the interviews 
are used to pinpoint historical events that are additionally elaborated on 
with our secondary empirical material. In the sociological / historical 
analysis, the interviews point to specific historical and current tendencies 
and conflicts, and statements by our interviewees, are, to a larger extend 
(than in the first part-analysis), used to specify the meanings of these 
tendencies. This, again, draws on the benefit of conducting the interviews 
ourselves with EU officials on location, thus being able to hear exactly what 
was said or communicated by other means than speech, e.g. gesturing and 
mimic.   
 
Interviews and theory 
The relationship between the theory, especially Campbell, and our use 
and processing of qualitative interviews, is characterized by a rather 
unique method. Both Lindner and Rittberger, but mostly Campbell, works 
with underlying ideas or paradigms in policy programmes. Due to the 
previously discussed problem with finding un-biased empirical facts, it is 
practically impossible to acquire qualified material concerning the 
inclusion and exclusion of ideas within the area of EU Regional Policy. 
Thus, we believe, that the empirical material ‘required’ or needed by our 
theory, is acquired in the most suitable manner possible. Moreover, the 
personal contact with the interview persons, allowed us to capture the raw 
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atmosphere in general as well as the ambiance at the specific interview. 
Something that is not possible to intercept from secondary sources. 
 
3.4 – Critique of the methodological use of interviews 
No doubt, there exist weaknesses in using the interviews as a contribution 
to the research domain and at the same time as analysis objects. There are 
several possible pitfalls. First of all the interview persons are given the 
opportunity to emphasize their own personal agendas, which is on the one 
hand can help contribute to a grander understanding, but on the other 
hand questions the validity of their statements. In the light of the 
difficulties attached, it has in the aftermath not been possible to identify 
issues that have been mentioned disproportional many times by one 
person. We believe that the statements are valuable enough to be handled 
in a further scientific context. Nonetheless, obvious prejudges have been 
left out of consideration. Another weak point by letting the interviews 
play such a central role is the risk that we have put our focus on some 
aspects from the beginning and by that constructed an interview-guide, 
which is misleading to the area of the Structural Funds. But this is a more 
scientific theoretical question, and may be defended with the argument, 
that some initial mythological assumptions must be taken and put up for 
contestation, with the risk of having unintended consequences for the 
study, in the quest of producing new scientific insights. A third problem is 
that the statements of the interviewees appeared incommensurable from 
time to time. This can be used to question the overall validity and reality 
of the research domain. However, incoherence between the interview 
persons does not have to represent a lack of competences, but merely a 
reflection of the relevant conflicts, present within the policy areas (and 
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maybe the rest of the EU) and thus be of immeasurable importance to 
especially the sociological-historical institutionalist approach. Lastly,  it is 
important to note, that few of the interview persons were willing to speak 
about the historical context of the Structural Funds due to a lack of 
‘historical knowledge’. This has on the one hand meant that secondary 
material has had to play a greater role in elaborating on the historical 
understanding, than expected. On the other hand, it further reassures us 
in the validity of the issues that were touched upon.   
Any weaknesses of the encompassing use of the interview, detected 
throughout the analyses, will be taken up in the overall evaluation of the 
projects validity in the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 4 – THEORETICAL TERMINOLOGY___ 
 
In the following paragraphs, the theoretical framework that is to be 
applied in the analysis is described. As already mentioned, the overall 
approach to this study of EU’s Regional Policy will have its vantage point 
in the theories of new institutionalism, a category including a broad range 
of subdivisions, each engaged in different and widely dispersed topics, 
but united in the shared emphasis of institutions as the appropriate unit of 
research, the rejection of the functionalist logic of behaviourism as well as 
the assumptions made by rational choice theorists about the behaviour of 
actors in policymaking (Pierson & Skocpol, 1996:2-4). Furthermore, 
institutions are analyzed as being actively affecting the political outcome 
generated inside the institutions (Wiener, 2003:137).  
After an introduction to the main methodological tools, derived from the 
historical institutionalist approach, the concept of path-dependence is 
presented followed by two theories deriving from a rational choice and a 
sociological perspective. Finally, it shall be discussed to what degree it is 
fruitful to combine elements from the three main schools of 
institutionalism in the same analysis. 
 
4.1 – Presentation of HI as theoretical framework 
Historical institutionalists study the effect of the time factor on 
institutions, how they are shaped and altered as a result of conscious 
deliberate action, un-reflected planning or protracted incremental 
processes. The institution is viewed as an unfolding process, gradually 
evolving, rather than being a static rigid, system. As in the rest of the 
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institutionalisms, the institution is seen as more than just a sterile, neutral 
organization that has no influence on the choices that are made inside of it 
– on the contrary, institutions are vessels of meaning, norms and rules, 
embedded over time, and this may have an impact on the solutions made. 
This is interesting, because it may explain how well-planned schemes may 
fail or turn out in another way than expected. Institutional inertia is an 
important focus point when studying the development of institutions, 
since this phenomenon might explain why institutions influence actors 
and thereby the choices made inside of it. Inertia or path dependence14 
represents the sum of former choices made, accumulated and stored in the 
institutions. Path dependence is a self-reinforcing, irreversible process 
which may prove to be a powerful mechanism of resistance to radical 
change. It can be illustrated by the image of a tree: the higher you climb, 
the more difficult it will be to shift your position from one branch to 
another. And the same is true when it comes to institutions; the longer an 
institution exists, the more fundamental become the initial decisions 
made, and the harder it may be to change the direction in which the 
institution evolves. This is due to the increasing returns that these quasi-
fixed relations generate and their importance to the integrity of the 
different roles actors may have in institutions (Pierson, 2002:7-9).  
 
4.2 – Path Dependency 
Path-dependency is a crucial element of the historic institutionalist 
approach (Peterson, 1999:18), which in the past years has gained 
momentum due to relevance and explanatory value (Pierre, 2005:29). At 
                                                 
14 Definition by Peterson, 1999:18: “Once a historical choice is made, it both precludes and 
facilitates others.” 
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the same time, the extensive use of the concept has lead to a dilation of its 
original meaning, a sort of stretching out its applicability, and thereby 
blurring the exact theoretical content, which may lead to confusion. In 
order to avoid such confusion, some clarification is needed before 
applying the concept to our analysis. 
By using Jon Pierre’s comparative discussion of three models of path 
dependency, a more differentiated understanding will be achieved of this 
concept and its impact on real world causal mechanisms and related 
concepts, such as critical junctures and formative moments. 
  
4.2.1 – Rearticulating the concept of path dependence 
The commonly held explanation of path dependency known to most 
scholars would be a historical choice, shaping and influencing future 
choices, suggesting a continuation of a particular policy with a certain, 
more or less outspoken emphasis on the deterministic causal logic 
(Pierson, 2002:2) 
According to Pierre, this static interpretation is constraining rather than 
rewarding, as it gives no satisfactory explanation of its causes or its 
validity as empirical cases are mostly chosen when some kind of 
permanence is obvious even to the most ignorant observer (Pierre, 2005:2-
8) 
From this perspective, Pierre takes his departure, trying to get beyond 
what path dependency implies, toward what it is caused by and, more 
important, “what breaks the spell”. 
One of the first scholars to grasp the concept of path dependence was 
American professor of political science Paul Pierson. Fundamental to his 
rational choice-inspired approach is the notion of increasing returns, 
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signifying the value of sunk costs and the existence of one or more 
equilibriums, consisting of optimal positions in which actors yield the best 
returns. The costs associated with a shift from one position to another, are 
represented by the difficulties connected to reverse course in the future, 
and the result is a multi-statical shift from one point to another (Pierre, 
2005:p.7) 
 
Another similarly recognised scholar, Katherine Thelen(1999), takes up an 
opposite view, arguing that institutional and ideational structures may 
play the decisive role in explaining path dependent policy caused by 
either “incongruities and intersections” between institutional logics and 
political action, or contextual structural effects in the form of “lock-ins”, 
preventing deviation from the course followed hitherto (Pierre, 2005:8,11) 
 
These two opposite statements considering origin and nature of path 
dependence serve as two extreme poles, in between which Pierre positions 
his own conception which consist of regarding path dependency as a 
dynamic, quasi-fixation of structured norms, values and practises, which 
is more gaining since it explains the relationship between structure, 
agency and actors in a more satisfying manner. (Pierre, 2005:11).  
 
This more dynamic perspective of path dependency helps us achieve 
two important analytical objectives. First, conceiving path 
dependency as a dynamic reproductive process allow us to escape 
the fallacy of putting historical elements equal to path dependent 
ones; just because a norm or relationship can be identified several 
times over time, it is not necessarily given that this element matters. 
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The concept of path dependency shouldn’t be mixed with the 
concept of antiquity. Second, it allows us to formulate a criterion 
based upon our dualistic theoretical approach, saying that a path 
dependent must therefore be recognised as path dependent in both 
theories. Ideas may loose their significance if the political situation is 
altered, just as the importance of a certain relationship between 
actors or institution may simply wither away, if the dominant ideas 
are sustaining the importance of the relationship withers away. 
 
4.3 – A rational choice perspective 
The problem of motivating one party to act on behalf of another is known as ‘the 
principal-agent problem’15  
 
This following theoretical clarification serves to elaborate the rational 
choice institutionalist approach that is to be applied in the analysis of EU’s 
Regional Policy. This part takes its vantage from Johannes Lindner and 
Berthold Rittberger’s approach to a ‘revisiting of historical 
institutionalism’. 
 
4.3.1 – A rational choice-based approach  
According to Lindner and Rittberger the key to understanding political 
decision making in the European Union lies in the perception of the Union 
as a complex dynamic process of institutional development, rather than as 
a tranquil photography (Lindner, 2003:447). They maintain that much 
policy outcome can be explained as stemming from inter-institutional 
                                                 
15 Wikipedia - the Free Encyclopedia 
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contestation, for what reason more attention should be devoted to the 
constitutional settings shaping and operating supranational institutions. 
On this basis, Lindner and Rittberger formulate their theoretical model 
that will be applied in a rational choice-based analysis of the Regional 
Policy as the outcome of institutionally influenced preferences. 
The vital components in this theory consist of a simple principal-agent 
relationship, suggesting a distinction between the ‘creation phases’ and 
‘operation phases’ of institutions in order to;  
  
“Shed light on potential tensions exhibited by institutional creations due to 
variations in actors’ action orientations in the creation phase [...] whether driven 
by instrumental calculations about the distributive effects of institutional choices, 
or by principle considerations, relating to decisions regarding appropriateness 
based on polity ideas” (Lindner, 2003:447). 
 
The background for this separation of institutional phases is the so-called 
‘negotiator’s dilemma’ which describes the negotiating situation as a 
dilemma for the actor due to the common aim of reaching collective 
solutions, while struggling himself with his individual aim of realizing his 
own agenda. This is perceived as a basic schism fundamental to all 
negotiations. This tension between achievement of the common good and 
the maximisation of individual preferences is a recurrent theme 
universally applicable and found in many forms, e.g. in Fritz Scharpf’s 
description of the European polity as suffering from a chronic state of a 
joint decision trap, implying that choices always bear the characteristic of 
the lowest possibly attainable common denominator (Sharpf, 1996:274).  
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4.3.2 – Creation phase  
The schism mentioned above is reproduced by Lindner and Rittberger in 
an itemized form. In the creation phase, the dichotomy between material 
and ideational preferences is rearticulated into two distinct concepts of 
concerns, namely regarding distributive material matters and philosophical 
concerns of choices among rules (Lindner, 2003:449), each equally important 
in different ways, when it comes to choices regarding institutional 
creation. This distinction between what an actor wants and in what he 
believes constitutes a two-level process through which institutions are 
established. The analytical task is therefore to separate negotiations of a 
distributive character from those concerning polity ideas. While 
recognizing both concerns as important, Lindner and Rittberger places the 
relevance of polity ideas over distributional concerns, as “constitutional 
dialogue cannot circumvent ideological differences”  (Lindner, 2003:450). On 
the other hand, if ideological consent prevails, and the negotiations 
concern sharing the benefits, solutions will be more easily attained insofar 
as the cost of spoiling the deal often will be relatively high compared to 
the possible achievable gain (Lindner, 2003:450). 
The authors suggest a linkage between the specificity of institutional rules 
and the nature of the dominant concerns when it comes to enacting 
institutions as pictured below. The specificity of the institutional rules 
mirrors the ideological consent - or lack of same - and becomes relevant in 
the operation phase, in which the executing coalition, containing actors 
concerned with running the institution, may choose to interpret or 
challenge the ‘rules of the game’. 
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4.3.3 – Operation phase 
Rules adopted by the enacting coalition in the creation phase frames the 
opportunities open to the executing coalition by deciding the rules of the 
game. However, it is still possible that these rules will be circumvented or 
interpreted post hoc. The distinction between creating and operating 
institutions is therefore not a one way process with two phases separated 
by waterproof shuts. Having already determined the general state of 
institutional rules, the likeliness of rule contesting behaviour is now 
addressed, and it is determined by several factors. 
 
Interpretation 
The rules are one of the most important factors, not only because of their 
influence on the bargaining power of actors. They also determine the cost 
of a contestation, dependent on the degree to which the rules are specified.  
If actors of the enacting coalition fail to resolve conflicting preferences and 
expectations in the creation phase, and if the executing actors are excluded 
from this phase, the possibility of rule contestation is present. This climate 
brings down the cost for rule contestation, because an unexpected 
Dominant concern Institutional outcome Open to interpretation? 
Distributive concerns 
Detailed and specific 
institutional rules reflecting 
agreement and consent 
No 
Conflicting polity ideas 
Vaguely defined rules reflecting 
disagreement in relation to 
ideology 
Yes 
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behaviour can be referred to as “just” a different interpretation. The 
contestation can be further reduced if there is no third party that arbitrates 
and enforces the dominant interpretation. (Lindner, 2003:452). 
  
Unity 
The unity of the contesting actors is also decisive for the costs. The more 
unified the contesting or defending a group of actors appears, the greater 
the chance that their contestation or defending will be successful. In the 
study of the unity linked to a contestation, the actors’ time horizon is also 
an important aspect (Lindner, 2003:452). 
 
Preferences over time 
Bargaining in the institutional operation phase is a natural by-product of 
conflicts over outcomes and institutions. But the bargains in this phase 
differ from the creation phase; “… the effects of institutional decisions on 
distributive outcomes become more visible in the institutional operation phase, 
and hence the uncertainty over the effects of institutional choices on outcomes 
decrease.” (Lindner, 2003:452). In the creation phase, the distributional and 
institutional outcomes are tradable. Sometimes, institutional and 
distributive gains coincide, at other times institutional gains can entail 
short-term distributive loses. The actors’ time-horizon is decisive for their 
stance in a given situation. An actor with a long time-horizon is more 
willing to accept a short-term distributive loss in return for institutional 
gaining, which in a longer perspective might entail distributive gains 
(Lindner, 2003:453). 
 
Congruence between enacting and executing coalitions 
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Some of the actors in the executing coalition are not empowered to 
participate in the process of rule-making and are therefore making a large 
effort in the operational phase trying to change the institutional outcome. 
The other way around actors from the executing coalition, that takes part 
in the enacting coalition are not so keen to contest the rule making to 
achieve institutional adjustment, but instead they try to obtain agreements 
with actors of equally standing in an attempt to create a formal rule 
change. Actors that both participate in the enacting and executing 
coalition have a more reserved attitude towards making use of rule 
contestation. A position that is in accordance with the one, actors who are 
limited to the executing coalition have, because actors of the enacting 
coalition try to protect the exclusive position by minimizing the possibility 
of rule-changing in the operation phase (Lindner, 2003:454). Finally there 
should be paid attention to the fact that the actors of the enacting coalition 
have their reputation to protect, which limit their scope of rule 
contestation, i.e. if they have to pay attention to the future co-operations 
before contesting a rule (Lindner, 2003:455). 
 
4.3.4 – The likelihood of rule contestation 
The likelihood of institutional conflict is higher the stronger the 
incongruence between the composition of the enacting and the executing 
coalition (and the more pronounced the difference in preferences among 
actors in operation phase) illustrated below.   
The larger the scope of interpretation of the enacted institutions, the 
longer the time horizon, and the stronger the internal unity of an actor in 
the executing coalition, the more likely it is, that an actor who is 
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dissatisfied with the institutional setting will pursue preferences for 
institutional change and contested rules. (Lindner, 2003:455). 
4.3.5– Summary 
The approach presented above, supported by Lindner and Rittberger’s 
conceptualization, will due the theoretical basis of the, in chapter 6 
following, RCI analysis. This is divided after the creation phase and 
operational phase, when analysing the historical progress of the regional 
policy. We chosen, primary to include the large EU-countries and the 
Commission as actors in the analysis. This is done on the background of 
the qualitative statements from our interviewees as described in chapter 3. 
The overall aim by using the RCI-approach is to study how rational 
choices, driven by actor’s calculating behaviour, have affected the 
development of the Structural policy from its launching and until today. 
 
4.4 – A sociological institutionalist approach 
As opposed to other branches within the field of new institutionalism, the 
sociological approach generally has had its focus on, not surprisingly, 
social processes in institutions or within groups of actors, with the 
purpose of describing and explaining the content of the identities or 
preferences of the actors in question, and the modes of social interaction in 
everyday life ‘where something else aside from strategic exchange is taking 
place’ (Checkel, 1999:548). The perception of what characterizes the 
institution as subject matter, is therefore rather different than the one of 
rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism, since the 
institution in these approaches is perceived as little more than a set of 
rules that to some extent may constrain the actors within them. 
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Sociological institutionalists, in contrast, describe the institution more 
broadly, and include the possibility of an institution to, not simply affect 
the strategic calculations of actors, but also to affect their most basic 
preferences and very identity (Hall & Taylor, 1996:15). The key 
contribution of sociological institutionalism to the institutionalist debate 
therefore is one of describing and explaining the ways in which 
preferences, beliefs and ideas are shaped by institutions. 
 
4.4.1 Schools within sociological institutionalism 
The branch of sociological institutionalism, however, is divided into two 
main approaches, which, despite their common origin, are necessary to 
distinguish. 
Sociological institutionalism as such is usually focussed on processes of 
social learning and the creation and effects of norms and ideas; these are 
usually observed in a micro perspective, where a number of specific actors 
and groups are pointed out, and the process e.g. from subjective ideas to 
intersubjective or shared norms is followed closely, with the use of 
parametres such as the density of interaction between individuals or the 
degree of insulation of the group of actors in focus (Checkel, 1999; 
Flockhart, 2004). However, when analyzing an entire policy field on a 
macro-level, and especially when doing so over a longer time span, it is 
obviously not possible to use the same kinds of tools, albeit the same 
processes are in focus. A social-constructivist approach to institutions 
could then be more adequate, in that it focuses on how ideas affect policy 
processes, and in that it takes for granted the assumptions about how 
institutions affect actors from sociological institutionalism, yet without 
examining the micro-level and actor-based processes per se. 
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On some points, it can be quite difficult to distinguish the constructivist 
approach to institutions from the sociological approach. In practice, this 
might in fact not really be necessary,  since they have a shared ontology, 
and to some extent the concepts deriving from each approach can 
supplement each other - and in fact they already do, since the labels of SI 
and constructivism are used interchangeably on the same concepts (e.g. 
Wæver in Wiener & Diez, 2004:207) This can be ascribed to what Checkel 
labels ‘the modernist branch of constructivism’, an approach which shares 
the basic ontological assumptions as constructivists, but has a loosely 
causal epistemology, and thereby claims to be able to explain and predict, 
instead of merely understanding political processes. At the same time, it 
takes a stance from methodological individualism (Checkel, 1999:546). 
 
The study of ideas in politics is in itself a minefield, since both rationalists 
and idealists are concerned with the role of ideas in institutions, and thus 
there is an on-going debate on what this rather undefinable concept is to 
contribute to. Some rationalists claim, that their approach in itself fulfils 
the aim of explaining changes of ideas about strategies (Moravcsik, 
1999:675), and therefore using a rationalist approach will be sufficient, also 
when seeking to explain ideas. Risse and Wiener (1999) opposes this view, 
by stating that when using the concept of ‘ideas’, rationalists and 
intergovernmentalists ‘bracket and exogenize these interests and 
identities, while constructivism tries to bring them into the light of 
investigation’ (Risse & Wiener, 1999:780). Campbell, as we shall elaborate 
on, also contest that most theorists do not have the proper tools for 
examining ‘ideas’, “because they have not specified precisely enough what 
they mean by ideas.” (Campbell, 1998:401) Additionally, the aim of 
moderate constructivism is simply to supplement the rational choice 
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studies of interest with a thorough study of ideas - not that this is a simple 
task in itself (Checkel, 1999: 547).   
 
The following paragraph serves to present the sociological institutionalist 
approach used in the second part of the analysis, an attempt by John 
Campbell to create a typology of ideas based on different structural 
dimensions, and using this in pinpointing the causal mechanisms that link 
ideas to policy-making outcomes (Campbell, 2002:21).  
 
4.4.1 – Ideas in politics 
Campbell’s terminology revolves around the concepts of ideas and 
interests, but as opposed to many other scholars he emphasizes that both 
ideas and interests play a vital role in affecting policy outcomes, and that 
it is the interaction between the two that spurs off policies. His point is 
that when focusing singularly on either one, there is a lack in 
understanding of the fact that some ideas might exist endogenously to the 
policy process, while being influenced by the interests that are at play in 
the struggles within the institution (Campbell, 1998:379). 
Campbell attempts to close this gap by introducing a conceptualization of 
‘ideas’ and their effects on policy outcomes. (Campbell, 1998:377) 
The main aim is to illustrate in what ways ideas are constitutive for 
institutions, and therefore he distinguishes between background and 
foreground aspects of the policy debate, the former representing the 
explicit arguments and the latter representing underlying assumptions of 
policy debates (Campbell, 1998:378) 
While historical institutionalism almost exclusively focuses on the 
normative or background levels and by that hardly perceive policy 
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making processes as constrained by ideas at all (Campbell, 1998:383), 
Campbell distinguishes between two different levels of ideas in policy-
making, a cognitive and a normative level; “At the cognitive level ideas are 
descriptions and theoretical analyses that specify cause-and-effect relationships 
whereas at the normative level ideas consist of values and attitudes.” (Campbell, 
1998:384). The scheme pictured below constitutes the basis for further 
elaboration. 
 
Ideas and their effects 
on policy making 
Concepts and  theories in 
the foreground of the 
policy debate 
Underlying assumptions in 
the background of the policy 
debate 
Cognitive level Programs Paradigms 
Normative level Frames Public Sentiments 
(Campbell, 1998:385) 
4.4.2 – The cognitive level 
At the cognitive level Campbell operates with two different concepts; ideas 
as programs, facilitating action among elites, and specifying how a specific 
political problem is solved. The other one, ideas as paradigms, limits the 
scope of what the elites perceive as worth considering in the policy-
making process, and by that restrains action (Campbell, 1998:385). 
 
Programs 
Often technical and professional ideas help the actors to develop specific 
solutions to their policy problems, by marking out a course for policy 
action which is decisive for cause-and-effect relationships (Campbell, 
1998:386). Programmatic ideas are presented in the cognitive foreground 
because of their precise and concrete nature, which has been articulated by 
policy-makers and experts. 
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Paradigms 
The cognitive background ideas are labelled as paradigms, and as opposed 
to the programmatic ideas the paradigms comprise a broad area of 
solutions. The constraining effects of paradigms limit the actors’ 
perceptions about what solutions that are useful for solving specific 
problems, and are “underlying theoretical and ontological assumptions about 
how the world works” (Campbell, 1998:389). 
 
4.4.3 – The normative level 
The normative level in Campbell’s terms is perceived as values and 
attitudes determining what programs are possible to legitimate to the 
public, in addition to “normative concepts that elites use to legitimize these 
programs to the public through processes such as transposition and bricolage” 
(Campbell, 1998:385). 
 
Public sentiments 
Public sentiments limit the range of solutions that elites are likely to 
perceive as legitimate to the public and by that politically acceptable. This 
means that even though a solution is coherent with the current paradigm, 
it can be rejected due to a lack of political legitimacy, or the perception of 
such (Campbell, 1998:392). 
 
Frames 
In Campbell’s model, ‘frames’ are concepts in the normative foreground 
that are used to legitimize programs so that they cohere with or change 
the public sentiment. The existence of frames enable policy makers to 
mobilize public sentiment in favour of their own programs, and thus 
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public sentiment is not only a constraining factor on the policy making 
process (Campbell, 1998:394). 
 
4.4.4 – The applicability of the model 
Campbell’s theoretical framework provides a model that provides the 
background for an examination of the concept of paradigms, in relation to 
the three other concepts in the model; programs, public sentiments and 
frames. Paradigms are of course central to the model, because they are the 
most constraining of the four factors, in defining what policies are 
legitimate.  
One problem that occurs when applying the concept of paradigms to a 
concrete issue, is that while the most interesting thing would be to 
discover whether a paradigm has taken place, it is,  however, difficult to 
prove a shift in paradigms. Campbell himself turns to the explanation, that 
paradigm shifts occur “when policy makers suddenly find themselves 
faced with unusual political economic problems for which the current 
paradigm offers no clear-cut solutions” (Campbell, 2002:23). As he 
accentuates, this definition is rather vague, and there is no saying how 
often a paradigm shift takes place, or how many paradigms can be 
apparent at the same time . Therefore, methodically, the researcher must 
argue that such a shift has in fact taken place - and thereafter elaborate this 
statement by a thorough investigation of the normative and cognitive 
ideas that affect and are affected by the shifting paradigms (Campbell, 
2002:32) 
 
4.5 – Syntheses of institutionalist approaches 
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Hall and Taylor’s proposition 
In the debate about the three big institutionalisms, a central concern is - as 
in other internal niche-debates - the relation between agent and structure, 
and how this can best be described in an institutional context. At the same 
time, another debate goes on in institutionalist circles, concerning how 
and to what extent the three approaches can or should be combined. The 
modest first attempts can be ascribed to HI-scholars such as Pierson (2002) 
and Hall and Taylor (1996), who more or less explicitly have been 
proponents of a combination of the three schools, placing historical 
institutionalism as a focal point. Hall and Taylor have in particular been 
supporters of this approach, in that they emphasize that rational choice 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism “share a great deal of 
common analytical ground on which the insights of one approach might be used to 
supplement or strengthen those of another” (Hall & Taylor, 23). The ‘calculus’ 
and ‘culture’ approaches that signify the two extremes in Hall’s view meet 
ends in the ontology of historical institutionalism, and thereby place HI in 
an “especially pivotal position” (Hall & Taylor, 1996:24). A variety of 
scholars express similar opinions; Campbell (1998) describes the problem 
as “the old debate between idealist versus materialist explanations of politics” 
that leaves students of institutions with the choice between ideas or 
interests as substantially more influential than the other. As also noted 
above, Campbell finds it more appropriate to examine how ideas and 
interests interact (Campbell, 1998:379). Overall, this is a call for more 
‘cross-fertilization’ between approaches, and to take this action as far as 
possible, according to Hall and Taylor, with the effect of revealing 
“different dimensions of human behavior and of the effects institutions can have 
on behavior” (Hall & Taylor, 1996:22). 
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Hay and Wincott’s critique 
However sympathetic this sounds, the approach has not only achieved 
uncritical accept. In their critique of Hall and Taylor’s view, Colin Hay 
and Daniel Wincott argue that the prospects for the creating of syntheses 
between institutionalisms are not as straightforward as Hall and Taylor 
suggest (Hay & Wincott, 1998:951). The key problem is, that forming 
theories across ontological boundaries, and especially when formulating a 
compromise in the shape of historical institutionalism, the distinctiveness 
of the different approaches inevitably will disappear. First of all, the 
unique social ontology of historical institutionalism vanishes when 
providing the researcher only with the choice of either a ‘cultural’ or 
‘calculus’ approach. According to Hay and Wincott, historical 
institutionalism has a distinct social ontology as formulated by Skocpol in 
the maxim “politics create policies, policies also remake politics” - using 
Hall and Taylor’s approach, this distinctiveness is neglected (Hay & 
Wincott, 1998:955). 
Secondly, the ‘calculus’ and ‘cultural’ approaches are to begin with 
mutually incompatible, and by nature symbolize the divide between 
rational choice and sociological institutionalism respectively.  
Thus, especially the notions of rational choice and strategic behaviour 
become irrelevant when mixing them with two fundamentally different 
approaches. But as Hay himself expresses it, this is in part due to the 
‘tendential structuralism of neo-institutionalism’; the moment the 
institution is recognized as the object of analysis, it becomes irrelevant to 
examine in isolation the behavior of agents, and “rational choice analysis 
moves from an apparently agent-centred individualism exhibited in choice, to a 
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deep structuralism, deriving action from context.” (Hay, 1998:952). When 
looking at Lindner and Rittberger’s revisiting of historical institutionalism, 
which has its roots in rational choice theory, this tendency is detectable; 
when setting up propositions in order to predict the actions of agents in 
different coalitions, the structure rather than the actor seems to be 
dominant, albeit the attempt to describe actors as driven by interests and a 
logic of consequentiality.  
 
But in fact, also the sociologist school has sacrificed some fundamental 
principles when entering the field of institutionalism. This becomes 
obvious when making the acquaintance with proponents of the SI-
approach such as Checkel (1999) or Campbell (1998), who generally accept 
the results of RCI-analyses, but find it in their way to show that an 
additional layer of conclusions could also be useful. This sort of moderate 
constructivism is relatively widespread16, and an explanation for the 
acceptance of e.g. the strategic behaviour of actors in institutions, could be 
the inherently actor-focused field of political science from which 
institutionalism derives.  
 
4.6 – Summary 
The main points to draw from this discussion, when embarking on an 
analysis founded on cross-fertilized theories, is to be conscious of the 
differences in the ontologies which these theories represent. We argue, 
that the problem illustrated by Hay and Wincott in forming or using 
syntheses of different institutionalist approches, can be disregarded to 
some degree; first of all, when using different theories with different 
                                                 
16 Although it may not be dominant, in the field of institutionalism. 
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ontologies, end results will inevitably be different because different 
questions will inherently be asked due to differences in the social 
ontologies, not of the specific schools of thought, but of the specific 
theoretic framework. 
Secondly, it seems that Hay and Wincott’s concerns are to some extent a 
concern that the project of cross-fertilization will not succeed. But taking 
advantage of synthesis-theories is not in itself a promise that all 
ontological aspects of institutionalism will be apparent in the final result. 
Therefore, we argue that there is really nothing to lose by using these 
theories, as long as they have an individual relevance for solving the 
problem in question. 
On a final note, however, the theoretic framework of this project is indeed 
founded in different ontologies – however synthetic the three distinct 
theories might seem – and therefore, in the following paragraph, some 
considerations on these differences will be addressed. 
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CHAPTER 5 – COMPARING INSTITUTIONALISM 
 
In this preamble to the analysis, the term institution will be discussed and 
the definition of the concept, as viewed from our different institutional 
theories will be assessed. What is characteristic about the institution-
concept we use in the project, is that the actors acting within the “Regional 
Policy institution” are the actual EU-institutions, such as the Commission 
and the Council, and member states. Thus we must distinguish between 
these two conceptions of the word institution.  
 
First we introduce Hix’ model on how a political system works. This helps 
us to explain how the HI-perspective lays down the foundation of 
involving terms and definitions of the various elements in the model from 
the two branches of HI theory. 
 
5.1 – A historical approach  
The two main theories are presented in the theoretical framework above 
are developed by Lindner & Rittberger, and Campbell, representing a 
more rational choice and a sociological branch of HI, respectively. Both 
theorists attempt to explain how institutions and actors preferences affect 
policy outcomes over time, but work from different ontological 
assumptions. This chapter makes an effort to systematize theoretical 
differences (and similarities) and point out what they can or cannot 
contribute with.  
 
A model of understanding – institution or political system? 
 64
In working with only a fraction of the overall political scope within the 
EU, whose nature is widely debated, we go way beyond the classical 
conflation of the state and the political system. The political system of the 
EU is highly decentralized and atomized and based on voluntary 
commitments of member states (Hix 1999:5). The regional policy, being 
our research area, thus can be characterized as a theoretically defined 
polity, with its own political system, with its own actors and its own 
institutional setting. According to Simon Hix, the political outcome in a 
political system can be described as a function of preferences and 
institutions: “Preferences x Institutions = Outcomes” (Hix, 1999:13) 
 
Preferences refer to the preferences of the relevant individual actors and 
institutions refer to the formal and informal rules that establish the 
framework for decision-making and the outcome (both political and new 
institutional forms) result from the interaction between these preferences 
and institutions (Hix 1999:13). Our different theorists, Lindner & 
Ritterberger and Campbell, have different conceptions of what determines 
the preferences and institutions, their rigidity and how they interact. 
 
An important aspect of the historical institutionalism is the focus on 
unintended consequences as a by-product of the creation of policies 
(Hall, 1996:7, Hix, 1999:12), consequences which are affecting the 
institutional framework, but also the polity ideas for the actors to 
whom they appear unintended; “ The institutional context of policy 
reform might produce a series of unforeseen obstacles and unintended 
consequences and it might block or pervert policy outcome by providing a 
platform for the operation of forces there are against the new 
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policies.”(Torfing, 2001:291). This is illustrated in an extended, 
however very basic, version of the Hix’ equation.  
 
        
The political system, or the institutional conditions structuring the Regional 
Policy, is the research domain of the analysis. Preferences referring to those 
of the EU-institutions (The Commission and the Council) and the member 
states, whilst the institutions are the formal and informal rules regulating 
the Regional Policy, the institutional framework, within which the EU-
institutions conduct political outcomes. In the following the regional policy, 
will be treated as the institution-link in the equation. By adding the 
unintended consequences, we add a time or a historical perspective, 
allowing the model to tell us what institutions and preferences are, how 
they are produced, and how they interact over time in the process of 
generating policy outcomes. Taking into consideration the fact that the 
budget for the policy (and the whole of the EU) is negotiated on a multi 
annual programming basis there is a legal basis for continuous alterations 
in both the actual policy content and the institutional framework, inter alia 
the balance of the struggle between polity ideas determining the scope of 
the institutional setup.  
In the following, this model will be theoretically conceptualized, in 
accordance with our theoretical approaches.  
 
Preferences Institutions =  x Outcomes 
Unintended 
Consequences 
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5.2 – Operationalizing the theoretical differences  
In describing the purpose with a two-part analysis, with the use of two 
primary theories, that both claim to be part of historical institutionalism, it 
is important to define and discuss their differences in the theoretical 
concepts of institution and preferences they work from, as well as in the 
dynamics they explain. The equation on political outcome being a function 
between preferences and institutions, thus can presents the highest 
possible denominator between our approaches, a suitable point of 
departure or tool, when describing their differences. 
 
To clarify the two theoretical concepts of institutions we use the elements 
of Hix’ equation; actors preferences and institutions. To describe the 
different perceptions of the elements in the equation and the different 
weighing on dynamics in generating policy outcomes, we let us heavily 
but indirectly inspire by Torfing’s comparison of the three new 
institutionalisms in which he answers his own questions on the 
characteristics of the ideal-typical directions within institutional theory 
and the role of the institution in the three camps.  The idea of this chapter 
is to put both Lindner & Rittbergers’s and Campbell’s theories into the 
highest possible ‘common ground’ model in order to more clearly exhibit 
their differences. In areas that they are not specifically elaborated by our 
theories, Torfing is used to characterize the tendencies within the 
theoretical strings.  
 
The epistemological differences of the theories are presented through the 
different meanings they ascribe to the links or parts of the Hix’ equation, 
for example what an institution is and when it changes.  
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5.2.1 – Johannes Lindner and Berthold Rittberger 
To illustrate Lindner and Rittbergers perception of institutional dynamics 
and theory of action, we have drawn a ‘Lindner and Rittberger version’ of 
the Hix equation. 
 
 
 
To interpret this equation, we first need to define what preferences, 
institutions and policy outcomes are.  
  
The preferences in Lindner & Rittbergers’ theory are linked to the different 
actors in an institution. Actors are of a rational calculating nature, whose 
preferences are to maximise their own interest. This must be discussed in 
relation to the term of institutions. Institutions are formal and informal 
rules, procedures and norms, constituted as an aggregation of different 
polity-ideas. These polity-ideas reflect the different perceptions of how the 
principal agent relation should be, determining the scope and 
competences of the rules and the decision-making. The preferences are 
Preferences            x          Institutions
Actors self-interests 
 
= 
Policy outcome 
result of strategic 
behaviour within 
institutional frame 
Unintended 
consequences Aggregated 
Preferences  
   Shape 
institutional structures 
are integrated in actors 
calculative behaviour 
 
exogenous factors 
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pursued by the rational preference-maximizing actors, either with 
instrumental calculations about the policy distributional effect of the 
policy outcome, or considerations relating to the pursued polity idea. The 
actors’ preferences are pre-given in the sense that they are affected by the 
possible yield for the actor from the policy outcome compared to the 
external factors. 
 
Even though Lindner & Rittberger represent a rather moderate version of 
a synthesis between HI a d RCI, it is important to note that the least selfish 
action of actors, will be the pursuance of a common decision, because it 
eventually will strengthen the position of the individual actor. This is 
elaborated by Lindner & Rittberger by saying that actors acting in 
accordance with the logic of consequentiality will always be conducted with 
a calculative motive of either loyalty to their own polity idea, or to 
position themselves more strongly in a longer time horizon of future 
negotiations. On the surface, it may seem as if they position themselves 
with common interests at heart, but the motive behind remains 
determined by calculated possible own winnings in the future 
 
To sum up, the impact of the structure of the institutions on the 
preferences of the actors is integrated into a rational calculating behaviour 
striving to self-maximize the effect of the policy outcome, thus being a 
measure that they have to take into consideration. Hence the institutions 
can be said to ‘constrain the rational choice of the actor’ (Torfing, 
2001:284), but the actor will nonetheless be consciously aware of this.   
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Thus the policy outcome is thus partly formed by the institution’s rules 
and norms that process or affect the actors’ preferences, eventually 
generating a political outcome. If the preferences structure of the actors 
change, either if the actors become subject to drastic external changes 
(outside the institution) or if the policy outcomes have unintended 
consequences for the preferences, an attempt to reform the sub-optimal 
institution can be made. However, due to the persistence of the 
institution’s rules and norms over time as well as the fact that they 
provide some benefits for the relevant actors, this can be a very costly 
procedure. Only when and if the costs of remaining within an existing 
institution producing inefficient or in-optimal policy outcome, exceed the 
costs of renegotiating the institutional set up, it will be attempted 
intentionally. However, institutional setups, norms, and rules are very 
hard to alter, and more often than not the institution will remain 
unchanged.  
 
Renegotiating the institutional setup requires active abstraction from the 
actors of the existing institution’s norms and benefits and a new possible 
intentional re-configuration of the aggregation of changed polity ideas.   
 
5.2.2 – Campbell 
John L. Campbell claims to work within a hybrid of historical and 
organisational institutionalism17 in his article ‘Institutional analysis and 
the role of ideas in political economy’, in which he reasons about 
sharpening the concept of ideas and clarify how ideas affect policy making 
(Campbell 1998:377).     
                                                 
17 Campbell, 1998 
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Taking the same point of departure as above, we will start out by 
elaborating Campbell’s interpretation of actors’ preferences. As opposed to 
Lindner & Rittberger’s rational choice approach, Campbell does not view 
institutionally relevant actors as being merely driven by calculations on 
own winnings and preferences. Campbell’s actors are much more 
integrated into the institution. He does not refuse the rationalist 
perception that actors act consciously in a calculative manner, calculative 
according to her preferences, but they act on a basis of more than 
calculative behaviour. They are viewed as more than cultural individuals 
with beliefs and identities, being characteristics that have deterministic 
meaning in the expectations of how individuals behave. In accordance 
with the rational choice approach, the preferences of the actors are 
constitutive for the institutions - however, the preferences are determined 
on the basis of a mutually constitutive relation between the institution and 
the actors’ identity.      
 
                    Preferences       x        Institutions 
Mutually constitutive 
identities and ideas 
= 
Policy Programs 
Result of struggle for 
meaning 
 
Unintended consequences 
exogenous factors 
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Thus, institutions are treated as constructs consisting of formal and 
informal rules and norms, and on top of that identities, ideas and beliefs 
(what Campbell conceptualizes as being constituted by underlying 
paradigmes), affecting the policy programmes. These norms and ideas are 
arguably very weakly defined terms, but their role is specified by arguing 
that in contradiction to the rational assumption according to whixh actions 
are determined by rational behaviour the actors act in a discursive 
struggle for the fixation of a common horizon (Torfing 2001:283). This 
constructivistic element implies that these ‘struggles for common 
meaning’ to a large extend are present on an unconscious level, over time 
aggregating common identities within institutions and mutually 
constituting actor identities and thus preferences. The double arrow 
between the preferences and institution in the Hix equation implies this 
mutual constitutive relation between institutional and actor’s identities 
over time. 
 
This mutually constitutive relationship integrates the actor further into the 
institution than assumed by Lindner & Rittberger. Discursive dynamics 
between the, over time changing, different actors identity and the common 
institutional identity, constantly struggles for “the fixation of common 
horizons of meaning to [the institution] in a contingent complex and 
chaotic world” (Torfing 2001:283). This illustrates the role of the 
exogenous factors like technology, economy crisis, etc. (Torfing 2001:284).  
 
Because of the self-embedded, constant reformulation of meaning of the 
institution, in the form of the policy programmes, institutions are difficult 
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to change. When the programmes are not in compliance with the actors’ 
preferences, new meaning (altered policy outcomes) is generated.  
The paradigms working in the background, represent the common idea of 
the purpose of the institution. As opposed to Lindner & Rittberger’s polity-
idea, shifts in paradigms do not necessarily entail changes in the 
institutional conditions. However, changes in the policy programs indicate 
changes in the underlying paradigms, thus illustrating that the external 
events has changed the conditions thus requiring another institutional 
purpose. Consequently, through generating new policy programmes, new 
meaning is granted to the institution, altering the underlying common 
assumptions about the basis of existence of the institution. The changing 
policy programs do not necessarily mean that the actual political objective 
has changed, but is to be viewed as a reformulation of the underlying 
paradigms. 
 
The above drawn considerations are after the following analysis, 
evaluated by a theoretical orientated discussion, with the purpose of 
relating this chapter to the conclusions from the analysis. 
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CHAPTER 6 – RATIONAL CHOICE ANALYSIS 
 
 Rome was not built in a day 
 
This chapter seeks to examine how the structural policy has reached it 
present state as a result of rational choices made by actors seeking to 
maximize their own interest. We hope to identify changes in preferences 
and strategies shaped by the institutionalised framework and 
organisational positions gradually being constructed over time. The 
theoretical approach will consist of Lindner and Rittberger’s model for 
institutional analysis, with emphasis put on the actors’ preferences.  
6.1 – Methodology 
An important methodological procedure prior to the analysis consists of 
clarifying its relations to both the empirical basis (interviews) and the 
theoretical framework. The course of action is historically clarifying, and 
structured around the historical overview acquired by processing the five 
interviews. The historical events or points originates from the interviews 
and are further elaborated with support of secondary material in order to 
secure a more detailed and comprehensive understanding. 
6.1.1 – The structure of this analysis is as follows: 
A central theoretical concept to Lindner and Rittberger consist of dividing 
the study of institutions into an operation and a creation phase. Having 
done a preliminary assessment, we decided that for European Regional 
Policy the institutional evolution consist of two very different periods, 
which implies the existence of two sets of creation and operation phases, 
subsequently phrased creation phase/operation phase 1 and creation 
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phase/operation phase 2. This partition sequences the order in which the 
analysis is presented.  
A: The first creation/operation phase, ranging from approximately 1975 to 
1985;  
B: The second creation/operation phase, ranging from 1988 to today. 
 
We are aware of the fact, that these different phases are mere theoretical 
conceptions, which may not correspond directly with reality, as processes 
overlap and a distinct separation is hard to place. Therefore, this division 
should only be considered an analytical remedy. 
 
Each part of the analysis (part A and B) begins with a historical review. 
This has two purposes; first of all it grants the reader a historical overview, 
necessary in order to understand the analytical content, and secondly, it 
determines the relevant factors or parameters for the succeeding analysis, 
in the form of part-analysis. 
 
6.1.2 – Choosing a point of departure 
It may seem strange that we begin our analysis of the structural policy 14 
years prior to the official establishment of structural policy. 
Our hypothesis is, that the dawning of the Regional Policy through the 
creation of the Regional Fund with the overall objective to reduce regional 
disparities is the bedrock upon which structural policy is founded and 
therefore the right place to begin the analysis. The decision to enact a 
Regional Policy with the intention to reduce economic disparities is 
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evident in the Commissions report drawn upon behalf of the Committee 
on Regional Policy (Com (73) 152 p. 10).  
Besides, the largest share of structural funding (objective 1: 78 % of total) is 
still used according to the same provisions initially enacted to direct the 
regional policy (Heinelt, 1996: 58 and Wallace, 2005: 227)  
 
6.2 – A - First period ranging from 1975-1985 
6.2.1 – Creation phase I 
The European Council, at the Paris summit, established the Regional 
Development Fund in 1975 (McAllister, 1996: 82).  The background for this 
undertaking into new (policy) areas hitherto uncharted was the accession 
of three new member states in 197318) (McAllister, 1996: 83, Heinelt, 1996: 
48).  
Though, arguably, several reasons might have contributed to the birth of 
the European Regional Fund, such as the beginning industrial decline, set 
off by the booming oil prices and the markets shares lost to foreign 
competitors. However,  it is clear, that when seen in the broader 
perspective the size of the funding is inadequate to serious counter such 
immense structural problems.19 Moreover the initial period (1975-78) was 
characterized by being subject to a national based quota system, 
effectively putting the configuration of the funds beyond reach of the 
Commission. The decisive factor should be found in the UK-European 
relationship and the British animosity toward the CAP-dominated budget 
                                                 
18 United Kingdom, (hereafter referred as UK), Denmark & Ireland 
19 They originally only accounted for approximately 257 millions ecu. (Peterson, 1996: 
149). 
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biased heavily towards complying German-Franco interest (Rossbacher, 
Appendix X: 2). 
That the policy clearly favourites UK and Ireland appears out of their 
combined share of the total regional policy budget constituting 34% of the 
total sum (Com (79) 349: 18)20. The British reticence was due to the 
discrepancy between the wish of the political elites to join the Union and 
the gloomy public atmosphere of what many saw as cession of 
sovereignity (Wallace, 1977:152). 
 
Thus, the fund formed a part of a complicated agreement, made in order 
to facilitate the Anglo-Saxon accession. This British animosity was 
anticipated by the original six member states, which failed to process a 
solution prior to the enlargement (Working paper document 178/73: 4). 
This was, however, put in order not long after the accession. Prior to the 
accession, only Italy had explicitly an interest in a regional development 
program on Community level, and as the British accession made this an 
issue, Italy supported the proposals heavily. The German opinion 
remained sceptical to the end, due to the already massive bulk of cash 
transfer from the exchequer in Bonn to Brussel. Taking into account that 
the perspective of revitalising a European monetary system relied heavily 
on British participation, Germany finally accepted to pay the lion's share 
of the expenses linked with setting up the funds (Wallace, 1977: 149-154). 
6.2.2 – Operation phase I 
Having created the new Common Regional Policy, the task of making it 
operational was left to the Commission, where it was placed under the 
                                                 
20 Together with Italy (40%) these three countries received ¾ of th total funds (Wallace, 
1977:155) 
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jurisdiction of Directorate General XVI (Wallace, 2005: p. 217). With no 
particular role for the Commission in forming the institutional settings, the 
definition of overall objective remained very much in the hands of the 
respective national governments, at least in the beginning. The proposals 
of the Commission were timid and tentative and fell between the 
ambitious plans and technical/budgetary problems (Wallace, 1977: 146). 
Throughout the rest of the seventies and the earlier eighties the 
Commission remained relatively impassive, as the regional policy 
continued to operate under the initially decided parameters (Dufeil, 
Appendix X: 9). 
A few exceptions can be made. In 1979 the Commission succeeded in 
securing a 5% non-quota section out of the total regional funding reserved 
for Community initiatives (Bulletin of the European communities 4/81: 56).  
 
The case for the Commission of improving the overall applicability was 
clearly not just a sudden impulse, as it also emerges three years earlier in 
the first assessment of the regional policy, explicitly stressing the need to 
transfer control of a smaller portion of the funds to the Commission to 
“make this instrument more efficient and more relevant” and in a broader 
perspective, to “take account of the regional effects of existing and future 
community policies” (Com(77) 195, p. 14).  
The period of 1980-1984 was characterized by an intergovernmental 
quarrel, originating in the relative high British payment to the budget, 
which was linked by the British to the increasing agricultural 
expenditures, which were heavily defended by French President 
Mitterrand.  
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Margaret Thatcher claimed that the UK was entitled to ”a billion pound” 
abatement in their contribution (Gillingham, 2003: 167). This event 
coincided with the European Parliament’s ambitions of displaying their 
recently acquired political influence, giving them decisional powers in 
budgetary negotiations. When this line-up collided, the Commission 
engaged in facilitating a solution to the problem, was prevented in taking 
further action in the struggle for the fund. An expansion of the regional 
policy would, almost certainly, mean a reopening of the whole financial 
situation, as this question would either involve a reopening of the 
justification of the budget or the actual distribution between the member 
states. Shackleton goes as far as to say: “The attempt to rectify the 
situation dominated the Community agenda in the first years of the 1980s 
until the Fontainebleau summit in 1984 (McAllister, 1996: p.141). 
 
Though the quota system was maintained throughout the 1980s, the 
definite, strictly fixed categories were gradually loosened up, eventually 
being replaced by ‘ranges’ of minimum and maximum limits of receipt, in 
between which a country was assured funding (Com (85) 516, p. 24). This 
transition reinforces the conception of the shift away from focusing only 
on the distributive aspects of ‘who gets what’ toward a broader 
Community perspective, more engaged with achieving efficient solutions. 
 
Another similar principle introduced by the Commission in 1980 was the 
concept of joint financing, in order to ensure that Community aid actually 
was spent on improving the regional structural development, and prevent 
the funding from being treated by member states (especially those 
discontent with their net contribution) as an easy way of reimbursing their 
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VAT contribution21. With this principle of making the funding dependent 
of certain conditions, the member states was compelled to, at least pay a 
share of the regional development programmes. This appears clearly in 
Bulletin of the European Union (4/81:61). 
There is, however, some doubt about the effect of this principle, in the 
period leading up to the reform in 1988. 
Bache holds that the principle was interpreted by; “…state executives as 
they saw fit…” (Bache, 2005: 175), suggesting that this was only a piece of 
mere pro forma policy statement. This problem was especially attributed 
to the controversy linked with British (conservative) animosity toward the 
European project in the eighties and early nineties, seeing EU regional 
policy as representative for; “…the kind of backdoor socialism coming from 
Brussel…” (Bache, 2005: 175) (Gillingham, 2003:283). 
 
The eighties saw another expansion of the funds, namely the 
Mediterranean enlargement22, incorporating three new countries, in many 
ways very different from the present states. The backward industrial and 
agricultural sectors in the these countries represented a substantial 
disparity, when compared to the average standard in the Union (Peterson, 
1999: 146). Furthermore, all three states had only recently adopted 
democratic political systems, in favour of more or less authoritarian ones.   
The decade was as described, smeared in budgetary strife, something, 
which did not end until Delors23, took office in 1985. The major role played 
                                                 
21 The most important source of European financial funding is derived from a 1% share 
taken from national VAT income. Countries such as the UK enjoys a particular high level 
of foreign trade, thus pays a relative higher share than its fellow member states.  
22 The accession of Greece (1981, Spain and Portugal (1986) McAllister, 1996:p. xxv) 
23 Head of the Commission 1985-1993 
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by Delors being the transition of the European community to the 
European Union. 
 
The mid and end of the eighties is marked by especially two events, 
central to the history of the Funds, as they meant a the undertaking of a 
major reform, converting both scope and means so fundamentally, that we 
believe that it is proper to conceive the reform of the funds in 1988 as a re-
creation and initiation of the Structural Funds. 
6.2.3 – Institutional analysis part 1 
 
Creating the rules of the game 
The creation phase of regional policy shows clear characteristics of being 
enacted as a result of an intergovernmental agreement. The coalition, 
constituted by the six member states and the Commission, shared a 
common interest in compensating the countries soon to join, especially the 
UK. Enacting coalition member states clearly saw the UK membership as 
important in a long-term perspective, thus sacrificing their own short-term 
distributive interests, accepting that this bargain represented a net 
transfer, beneficiary to the UK. The Commissions role in the creation 
phase wasn’t a clear reflection of their preferences regarding regional 
policy, as the action taken after the creation shows, that the Commission 
might have preferred a more thoroughly, deliberate set of rules. The cost 
of obstructing the deal was however too high, as they alternatively would 
have no regional policy, and thus no community program under their 
jurisdiction. 
The institution created can therefore be said to be dominated primarily by 
the distributive concerns of ‘who should have what’ rather than based on 
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unanimity, on what common principles and values that should sustain the 
policy. The lack of an overarching ‘polity-idea’ is showed merely by the 
organisation of the distribution of funds following a national quota-
system. 
 
Hence, the result of the initial consensus regarding regional policy was a 
poorly specified deal, with concerns mainly dealing with the question of 
distribution, with little mentioning of formal and clearly defined goals. 
The vagueness regarding ideology made it (very) open to interpretation 
by the executing coalition, which consisted of both member states and the 
Commission (cf. 5.2.1 – creation phase). 
 
Contestation stemming from distributive concerns 
The British stance in relation to regional policy resulted mainly from their 
discontent with their budget contribution. The minimalist approach to EU 
budget lead the British to oppose any further specification or progress of 
the policy, in order to keep their (own) expenses down. The interest may 
be characterized as short-sighted, what explains why they didn’t succeed 
in the longer run in getting their wanted budget abatement through the 
regional policy. Another reason might be found in the inconsistency 
between on one hand wanting to reduce the overall spending and on the 
other hand trying to secure as much as possible to one-self. 
 
Another effect of the loosely defined rules, regarding how the funds were 
spent, impelled the Commission to take steps in order to ensure a proper 
spending. The British view was that the direction and use of the funds 
were to be done without interference from the Union. The initial 
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institutional rules didn’t include any opinion on how the means made 
available from the fund should be used, which resulted in 9 different 
models of implementation. 
 
The institutional conflicts vis-à-vis distributional outcomes meant that a 
change happened in the preferences of certain actors. The regional policy 
represented a negative transfer for most of the continental member states, 
originally accepted in order to facilitate the accession of UK, Ireland and 
Denmark. Through the eighties the most influential states, Germany and 
France, were brought closer to the community opinion, advocated by the 
Commission. This may be understood by the fact that these two states had 
already prevented themselves from pursuing direct monetary benefits (as 
they actually lost funding by the creation of regional policy), leaving it the 
only option to follow a comparatively, long-term strategy of influencing 
the institutional settings. 
 
The Commission’s interest was unlike the rest of the actors in the coalition, 
not financial, as they have no fixed budget, but rooted in their task of 
making the overall policy work. This involved at that time, obtaining 
control with the funding through more general ideologically founded 
provisions, representing the common community interest. Therefore the 
Commission acted according to their own idea of what sound community 
policy should be, namely policy on a community level, rather than a 
national one, as this was seen as ineffective.    
The various undertakings such as complementary spending24, and 
Community Initiatives represent the attempts made by the Commission in 
                                                 
24 Foremost represented through the principle of additionality  
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order to consolidate the existing policy idea with additional, more 
specified guidelines in order to improve its efficiency. The conclusive 
points of this analysis can be summarized as done below: 
 
A) Distributive concerns dominated the institutional creation phase, rather 
than ideological concerns. It would not be correct to assume that consent 
was prevailing regarding the aim and use in an ideological sense, but 
rather or on the contrary, that this construction was based on a practical 
mutual understanding, neglecting broader consideration of an ideological 
nature. 
B) The commencement of regional development policy may be thought of as 
compensation, as the distribution of its means between member states 
shows that the policy clearly favour the UK and Ireland. The 
compensational nature of the policy resulted in a lack of establishment of a 
sharply defined institutional framework with clear rules which leaves a 
broad scope for interpretation in the operational phase. 
C) The Commission successfully obtained minor rectifications of the 
policy, demonstrating that they had an agenda of their own, different from 
the member states, and that they managed to introduce basic principles, 
reflecting their interpretation of a community interest. 
 
6.3 – Creation phase II 1985-1988 
The launch of the Single European Market (SEM) and the Single European 
Act (SEA), the almost complete reconditioning of the Commission and the 
accession of the two Iberian countries, provided the Commission with the 
optimal historical context for re-launching the Regional Policy (Dufeil app. 
X:9,13, Michelis app. X:1) under a new label; the Structural Policy 
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(Michelis app. X:6)25. This Structural Policy bound together the three 
independent Funds, thus putting the Regional Policy in a new consistent 
framework, within which it was given a more central role in the 
development of the European Union (Peterson, 1999:151). In legal terms, 
the SEA linked the idea of cohesion to the reduction of regional 
disparities, as the provision, we know as ‘economic and social cohesion’, 
and provided a treaty base for the Commission, to reform the objectives 
and the implementation processes of the Structural Funds (Moussis 
2005:208). In the following, it will become evident, that ‘the Commission 
exploited this opportunity to the fullest.    
 
6.3.1 – A strong Commission 
As opposed to the first creation phase, the Commission played a crucial 
role in the recreation of the policy, foremost personified with the President 
of the Commission, Jacques Delors (Head of the Commission 1985-96 
(Gillingham, 2003:152)) (McAllister, 1996:p. 173, Dufeil app.X:14). Mr. 
Delors is by many scholars (Wallace 2005:98, more) and our interviewees 
(de Michelis, Appendix X:12 ;Dufeil, app. X:12), described as a strong, 
entrepreneurial President, committing himself to the completion of the 
SEA (Wallace2005:98, DK1 app. X:10). He was very well backed by his 
college of Commissioners and by a coalition of allies among the Member 
States26 (Dufeil, app. X: 5).  
 
Still, the Council of Ministers must also be taken into consideration 
(Rossbacher, app. X:3). The three new southern Member States’ general 
                                                 
25 Assessing what he defines as Structural Policy 
26 France and Germany and the BeneLux 
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preferences concerning re-distributive regulations can be described as 
positive, as they all qualified in all measures as being the ‘poor countries’ 
(Hooghe, 1996:196). However, one decisive factor remained the question 
of whether Germany and France could obtain consent and vote by 
common assent. This mutual understanding was reached at the 
Luxembourg summit in 1985, where the respective state leaders, President 
Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl, agreed to an extensive increase of the 
structural policy (Rossbacher, app. X:7; Gillingham, 2003:284). The 
German approval was especially important, as an increase in the 
European budget would be deflected in the increase in German 
contribution, as they paid the biggest share financing the Union (Wallace 
2005 app.X:201). British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, whose general 
enthusiasm toward the union project or Delors was less than whole-
hearted, accepted the doubling of the budget, as the SEA represented the 
for long anticipated liberalization of the European market (Gillingham, 
2003: 165).  
 
6.3.2 - The creation of Structural Policy 
The reform of 1988 was important in several aspects, as it meant a 
strengthening and an expansion of the policy, fundamentally changing its 
role and purpose (Dufeil app.X:2,9). This reform was part of a larger 
budgetary reform known as the Delors-1 package.  The ‘reformed’ 
structural policy represented a concept, which is normally recognised by 
scholars as the true policy and therefore normally used as a natural 
reference point, when dealing with structural and cohesion policy in the 
Union. It represents a substantial qualitative step, compared to the 
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relatively impassive and static time-span, dealt with in the previous 
decade (Peterson, 1999:148, Dufeil app.X:9). 
 
 A doubling of the budget 
The recreation of the regional policy27 included a doubling of the 
structural funds, from 3,311 billion € in 1987 to approximately 7 billion € in 
1989, increasing to 11,66 billion € over the next 5 years (Heinelt, 1996:58). 
The main reason is to be seen in the accession of Spain and Portugal and 
the anticipated problems, connected to the establishment of the single 
market (Dufeil app. X:9, Michelis app. X:1), Com(87) 376 1/2:7). 
At the same time, the portion reserved for the Community Initiatives was 
substantially boosted from 5 to 10 percent, a further surrender of 
sovereignty, which could be justified in the deepening of the Union by the 
creation of the single market, an undertaking that would, almost for sure, 
imply troubled times for some of the poorest regions. This newly obtained 
Community share of the budget was channelled into 21 Community 
programmes, addressing a variety of structural problems present at 
Community level.  
These Community Initiative programmes constituted an intricate complex 
mechanism of micro zoning, as the subjects addressed stretched over a 
wide range of different topics (Rossbacher, appendix X:7), clearly 
mirroring the many different interests involved in determining the 
development of the Structural Funds and can therefore be said to reflect 
the aspect of centralization in the reform (Rossbacher, appendix X:2; 
Dufeil appendix X:2).  
 
                                                 
27 After the reform, the concept of regional policy is substituted by the term of structural 
policy 
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Re-ascertaining of four main Principles 
In a continuum of the first operation phase, the Commission created four 
principles with the purpose of guiding the implementation of the 
structural means. These main principles Concentration, Additionality, 
Programming and Partnership were reinforced and re-adopted in course of 
producing a uniform Structural Policy (Heinelt, 1996:49, see also chapter 
1.3). 
 
Concentration 
The most important objective of the reform was the joining of three 
existing policies into one single, coordinated policy, in order to give them 
a stronger overall impact. The main emphasis was put on concentrating the 
effect of the already existing instruments. The issues addressed 
individually by the respective (formerly independent) funds was 
conceived as coherent and intertwined, such as problems involving 
structurally conditioned unemployment in rural areas (often entailed to 
specific regions) (Heinelt, 1996:p. 50). Therefore the concentration of funds 
was seen as a requisite provision, which also, very conveniently, required 
a further abolishing of the original quota system, as five new objectives 
was introduced (Objective 1-5) (Com(87) 376:13), which focused on certain 
regions, groups and segments of the population, giving the Commission 
stronger influence on the distribution of the financial means. The 
Initiatives were to be administered through a highly centralised process, 
as the idea was to substitute the 12 different models of national 
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implementation with one single uniform European implementation model 
(Richardson, 2004: 249, Hooghe, 1996: 13).  
 
Additionality 
Likewise, a similar emphasis was put on the remaining principle of 
Additionality, whose relevance was enforced through a decision of a 
compulsory minimal national co-financing of 50 % (Bache, 2004:174) and a 
strong encouragement of the inclusion of sub national actors in the 
process. The objective for the funding was to ensure both national and 
regional financial means of projects and ensure a mutual commitment. 
 
Partnership 
The notion of partnership, closely aligned with additionality, was also 
made a core principle, as this principle was formalised, requiring “…close 
consultation between the Commission, the member states concerned and the 
competent authorities designated by the latter at national, regional, local or other 
level” (Bache, 2005:166). This principle becomes indeed very important for 
the later development, as the Commission used this occasion to centralize 
a substantial part of the implementation process under their own 
jurisdiction (Com (87) 376: 15-17). 
 
Programming 
The notion of programme planning, encompassing multi-annual, multi-
task and occasional multi-regional programmes rather than uncoordinated 
national projects (Wallace 2005:218), was reinforced and the Commissions 
role in the coordination of the common programmes was enhanced. 
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6.3.3 – Summary 
Three points should be extracted from creation phase II, as being 
characteristic of the re-creation or creation of the Structural Policy. Firstly, 
the Commission was a major influential actor, facilitated by a strong 
President and a general consensus among Member states to engage in this 
project. Due to the active presence of the Commission in this creation 
phase, it was able to put itself on the co-driver seat in the ongoing process 
of re-evaluation and implementation. Secondly, the financial means were 
doubled, both overall, but also the percentage share reserved for 
Community Initiatives administrated by the Commission, again 
emphasizing the strength of the Commission. Thirdly, the administrative 
principles, also initially created by the Commission over the previous 
operational phase, were re-adopted and enhanced, emphasizing the 
common and coordinated aspects of the structural policy.  
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6.4 – Operation phase II 
This period stretches from the enactment of the reformed structural policy, 
to the Lisbon strategy, which was the latest common, overall decision 
related to regional policy (Dufeil app.X:4).  
 
The political link between the Delors-2 package and the Treaty of 
Maastricht (TEU) is similar to the link between the Delors-1 package and 
the SEA. The Delors-2 package was launched in February 1993, five days 
after the signing of the TEU (Wallace 2005:200).  
 
The Edinburgh European Council  
The Edinburgh Council, 1992, failed to accept the Commission’s proposed 
overall budgetary increase (Wallace 2005:200). Commission President 
Delors had proposed a Community budget around 2 % of the GDP of 
member states in year 2000 (Gillingham, 2003:285) opposed the existing 1.2 
%. The Mediterranean enlargement heightened the necessity of 
redistribution, which was reflected in the reached agreement on a 41 
percent increase in Structural spending, favouring the poorest parts of the 
Community, the cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland). 
This was to be financed through a newly created financial instrument, the 
Cohesion Fund28, helping the four countries to reach the convergence 
criteria for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  
 
                                                 
28 These funds consist of massive cash transfers dispersed on a national level, rather than 
a regional. They target the then four poorest countries; Spain, Portugal, Greece and 
Ireland. The relationship between fund and receiver gave rise to the common designation 
the cohesion countries (Moussis, 2005: 223). At the Edinburgh summit, it was agreed that 
Spain was entitled to receive between 52 & 58 %, while Greece and Portugal should have 
app. 20 % each, and Ireland 7%. (Wallace, 2005: 221). 
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The creation of the Cohesion Fund also corresponds with the idea of 
concentration, as the extra funding would only target the regions most in 
need (Wallace, 2005: 236). Delors’ original wish for a Community budget 
of a full 2% of the total European GDP was however not fully met as the 
idea faced increasingly opposition when public opinion started to 
change29. The UK fiercely resisted the budgetary increase, but a tactical 
blunder by Mr. Major over the adoption of a social chapter isolated the 
British opinion and the proposed budgetary doubling was adopted, 
(Gillingham, 2003:287), leaving the Community with a budget now 
constituting 37% of the total EU budget over the next five years.  
 
Member states’ quest for repatriation of control 
Even though the member states agreed on a large increase in the structural 
spending, certain tendencies asserted themselves at the Edinburgh 
Agreement, counteracting the decisions from the creation phase. The 
member states expressed a ‘desire for greater flexibility in the 
arrangements for allocations from the Structural Funds as well as a 
willingness to devote enhanced structural funds means exclusively to the 
poorer states (Wallace 2005:219). This statement was made after the 
publication of an internal EU document (SEC(94) 16541: 7), which revealed 
massive problems connected with the distribution of funds, both those 
distributed in support of national regional programs and especially those 
given through the community initiatives (Gillingham, 2003, 305) (Hooghe, 
1996:55). 
 
The enlargement of 1995 
                                                 
29 (This was just prior to the ratification of Maarstricht) 
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Not long after the TEU came the question of enlargement of the Union 
with Austria, Sweden, and Finland (Rossbacher app.X:10). The three 
countries joined the Union in 1995. The only change in the Structural 
Policy was the creation of a sixth objective, addressing the sparsely 
populated Nordic areas, which absorbed only 3 per cent of the total funds 
(Rossbacher app.X:10). However, the negotiation period was marked by a 
radical change in the ‘balance of forces’ (Wallace 2005:201). Many events, 
both outside and within the Union, entailed the tightening of economic 
conditions in Europe, affecting the attitude of the major contributing 
member states towards the extensive Structural Policy. These events and 
their effect on member states’ preferences will be discussed under the next 
heading.  
 
 
Budgetary preferences and member states preferences 
The expansion of the budget over the last two periods had led to the 
emergence of a ‘net contributors’ club’, a group of member states being 
increasingly concerned with their financial commitment to an increasing 
overall EU budget (Michelis, app.X:3, Wallace 2005:201).  
The major historical events generating impact on the member states’ 
preferences on where the Structural Policy should be heading were: the 
German unification and the entailing costs, the costs of helping especially 
the Mediterranean countries reach the convergence criteria for adopting 
the EMU, the envisaged costs of a future eastern Enlargement, adopting 10-
12 countries, substantially poorer and less developed than the existing EU-
15 countries and, last but not least, the financial management crisis of the 
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Commission leading to the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 
(Gillingham, 2003: 314) 
 
The Unification of Germany 
An important member state in this ‘net contributors’ club’ was Germany. 
Having been the vital ‘bearer’ of the budgetary burden in the 1988 and 
1992 reforms, she was now concerned about the shock of paying for the 
unification with East Germany, something that changed her attitude to the 
budget and especially to the Structural Funds. (Dufeil, appendix X:8) Even 
though Germany had received 3 billion € for the ‘unification period’ 1992-
93 based on the costs envisaged, the actual costs of unification largely 
exceeded the expectations. 
 
 
The convergence costs of adopting the EMU 
In many ways, the second doubling of the Structural Funds budget, the 
creation of the Cohesion Fund, can be argued to be a facilitating measure 
of the EMU, compensating for and strengthening the countries with a less 
developed potential for harvesting benefits of a Monetary Union.  
 
 
 
Prospect for Eastern Enlargement 
In 1993, at the Copenhagen Council, member states accepted the principle 
of a future enlargement eastwards. The accession of many comparatively 
poor states (Wallace 2005:201) put pressure on more redistribution, 
especially financed through the Cohesion Fund. This event showed the 
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first chink in the relationship between the original cohesion countries and 
the rest of the member states. The prospects of the eastern enlargement is 
easily demonstrated below, showing the relative GDP/capita in the new 
member states, compared to EU 15 average (EU-15 = 100)30. The eastern 
enlargement would mean a 20 % increase in population, but similarly only 
to a 4-5 % increase in GDP, creating a statistical effect, which means that 
some ‘old’ EU-15 cohesion countries would be rendered as affluent (above 
75% of average GDP per capita) in an EU-27 context, although their GDP 
didn’t change (Wallace 2005:232).  
 
 
 
The financial management Crisis 
In the time following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the legitimacy 
of the Union was increasingly questioned, especially by the member states 
(Gillingham, 2003: 299). This management issue culminated in March 1999 
and resulted, as mentioned, in the resignation of the Santer Commission. 
The management of the Structural Funds were a major issue in this crisis, 
                                                 
30 Per Capita GDP of CEEC in comparison to EU-15 (purchasing power standards 1998 in 
€ (Figure: Christian Tuschoff 2001)  
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especially the management of the Community Initiatives. Despite the vast 
discontent and conflicts, the debate did not block European affairs, but 
was projected onto the negotiations on the following review of the 
financial perspective. 
 
Agenda 2000 – The Commission’s proposal 
Immediately after the negotiations on the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA), the 
Commission delivered its proposal for the management of the 
enlargement. The Agenda 2000 documents, the third financial perspective 
defining the Community budget, was characterized by being less radical 
than the first two financial perspectives, dealing more with incremental 
adjustments rather than an increase in resources (Wallace 2005:201). This 
reflected the political climate, described above. It proposes as well, that the 
overall spending on structural matters should be frozen at 0.46 per cent of 
the EU GDP, and the overall Community budget at 1.27 per cent, meaning 
that for the period 2000-06, an amount of 230 billion euros should be spent 
by the structural funds and 45 billion euros on the Cohesion Fund.  
The Cohesion Fund was reserved primarily for pre- and post-accession aid 
for the new members, thus curtailing the four original receivers of the 
cohesion funding. Furthermore, the proposal aimed at a concentration of 
the funds and a simplification of the implementation. The six objectives 
were to be reduced to only three, covering only 35-40 per cent of the EU 
population, and unemployment being a major criterion for the new 
objective 2. 
 
The Berlin Agreement 1999 – a weakening of the supranational 
institution? 
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The Council concluded a deal an early morning in March 1999 on the 
Agenda 2000 proposals, after lengthy and sharp negotiation. The 
agreement for the period 2000-2006 fell much below the original proposal 
(258 billion euros instead of 275 billion) with 45 billion ring-fenced for pre-
accession aid. In line with the lengthy negotiation and the cut back of the 
structural budget, member states forced the Commission to accept a 
further loosening of two of its principles; especially partnership and 
additionality. Most of the proposals of the Agenda 2000 were modified, 
although the reduction of the six objectives to just three objectives31 went 
through (Gillingham, 2003:319 and Europes Agenda 2000:12). 
First with the Lisbon Council in 2000, the Union did set new, altered, long-
term goals for itself (Michelis app.X:4). The major goal was to become the 
‘most competitive knowledge-based economy in the World by 2010’. This 
more “outward looking” goal was to be facilitated by intensifying the 
investment in research and technology. In Structural policy terms, this 
provoked a lot of discussions on whether the strong emphasis on 
competitiveness is compatible of contradicting with the cohesion policy. 
Mandated by Romano Prodi, the Commission’s President from 2001, a 
report was drafted by a group led by a Belgian economist, André Sapir, 
following up on the new focus of the Lisbon Agenda, presenting new 
measures to help the EU overcome its sluggish growth (Gillingham, 
2003:324-325). It questioned the very existence and efficiency of the 
Structural Policy for achieving the overall goal of reducing regional 
disparities in the Union and recommended that cohesion resources should 
instead be spent on building institutional and physical capacity along with 
                                                 
31 As described in the introduction to the regional policy in chapter 1  
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developing human capital. Only the poorest regions should for some time 
be entitled to receive structural assistance. 
 
6.5 – Institutional Analysis part 2 
On the background of the preceding historical overview, 
creation/operation phase II, the following section elaborates on this 
historical basis, based on the theoretical approach described in the 
theoretical chapter. 
 
Creation phase 2 
The creation phase of 1989 represented both a cementation of already 
established principles and an introduction of new administrative 
principles. The entrepreneurial Commission President Delors skilfully 
exploited the transformation from community to union in order to 
accelerate the structural policy as far as possibly. 
The parallel enactment of the foreign market and the achievement of 
multi-annual budgetary solutions significantly reduced the inter-
institutional arguing in the Council and between the Council and the 
Commission, by shifting the focus toward the greater goal; the European 
Union project. 
 
One very important aspect, that are clear when reviewing creation phase 
II, is the presence of a period with a very strong Commission, illustrated 
by the President of the Commission from 1985-1993, Jaques Delors. The 
Commission were the driving-force in the reformation of the Structural 
Funds in the late eighties, but as any other actor, the Commission is seen 
from a RCI perspective driven by self-interests and should therefore not 
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necessarily be seen as the “great” ideological EU-institution. The 
Commission’s self-interest is just different from the interest of member 
states in the way that the Commission is not forced to ensure a pay-back of 
tax payers money giving the Commission the possibility to act as a 
mediator in reforming the regional policy. Crucial for the development 
was the mutual understanding between the Commission and a number of 
the most powerful national leaders with the German and the French in the 
lead. 
 
One of the most significant steps taken in creation phase I, was the 
agreement on a multiplication of the budget from around €3 billions in the 
year of 1987 to around €11 per year in 1989 and culminating at almost €35 
billions per year  in 1999. This increase is primarily reasoned by the 
Mediterranean enlargements in the eighties and by the settlement of the 
common market. The Commission succeeded in gaining ground for the so 
called Community Initiatives, by which it became responsible to 10 
percent of the regional policy budget., where these initiatives appeared as 
micro-zoning programmes (cf. 6.3.2). 
The overall argument for the augmented spending was to hinder the 
poorest and worst prepared regions in suffering from the side-effects of 
the Single Market. This argument was also used by Delors in the 
justification towards member states. 
 
The reason for member states support to the budget rise, especially 
support in form of capital, were that the Commission could convince them 
that it were for their own best. The argument was that they would actually 
gain from an efficient single market, which was only achievable by a 
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massive support of the regions not  economically competent to participate. 
At the same time, a support to regions lagging behind would compensate 
for getting bulldozed of a booming common market in the Community 
which they might not be come part of. 
 
Delors achieved by connecting the regional policy to the overall European 
project (cf. the regional policy as supporting the achievement of the Single 
Market), to legitimate the existence of the regional policy and the 
Structural Funds in the following period. It created a clear aim for  the 
policy by linking it to the further development of the Community, and at 
the same time made the economic contribution more acceptable for 
member states, because the Single Market was an important issue for 
member states making Structural Funds a mean that all actors could agree 
on even though it represented different implications depending on the 
actors national situation. 
 
However, what can not be considered as optimal and fully thought 
through is the way the distribution of funds were organised. The fact that 
the perspectives for the contribution to the budget again and again could 
end up in an economic wrangling between member states and the 
Commission was ignored. The deal was made acceptable primarily 
through the generosity of Chancellor Kohl, an arrangement that in a retro-
perspective must be rendered a flaw, as a more permanent financial 
solution could have diminished the potential of budgetary disputes.   
 
Operation phase 
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When we look at the operation phase is it clear that it seems as a 
groundbreaking reform of the European project by which possibilities to 
develop the policies further appeared. But as mentioned above, the 
aesthetic of the reform had severe defects that gave rise to problems in the 
following operation phase. 
Firstly the actor’s preferences are decisive to the policy’s destiny. Delors 
succees in creating a common interest between the member states, 
however with the absence of a lasting financing model, did leave the 
member states with a number of issues, which opened to a comprehensive 
rule contestation. 
When the enacting coalition, consisting of the member states, represented 
through the Council, and the Commission, achieved unanimity, it was 
only partly, as the proposals from the Commission reflected a diplomatic 
and skilful manoeuvring in order to satisfy everyone to ensure progress. 
How this apparently united coalition was only temporary and its 
members more scattered in some questions than it would be expected, and 
which consequences this would have for the institutional development, 
will be dealt with in this section. 
 
Institutional rule contestation 
Partnership 
The notion of including the regional or local (sub national) actors or/and 
social partners did (perhaps intentionally) mobilize political units with 
views different from the national states. The reaction from the national 
states vary all through the Union, depending on the historic and political 
traditions regarding dispersion of power in the member states. The 
mobilization of political sub-entities, potential alliance partners for the 
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Commission may have surprised and startled the national governments, 
fearing that their power and sovereignty being undermined, as they were 
to be exposed to pressure coming from both ‘above’ and ‘below’. When 
comparing the initially settings in the creation phase, with changes made 
in the operation phase, this view is confirmed. Through the change 
induced in the Berlin Agreement the obligation to consult regional 
authorities was loosened considerably, making this option voluntary, and 
instead stressing the need to consult social and economic partners. 
 
Community Initiatives 
Another element in the reformed structural policy is the extended 
Community Initiative programme, which is markedly reduced throughout 
the nineties. This is given two causes. First, audit control, showing 
considerable implementation problems, caused by hierarchical 
management, in which the DG REGIO was involved several times in the 
process, but without having the required instruments of control. Secondly, 
an increased scepticism toward the suitability in the micro-zoning 
approach gained hold through the nineties. It was argued that the 
European perspective was somewhat lagging in very small territorial 
entities, and the number of initiatives was reduced from 21 to 4. 
 
Additionality 
In addition to the two previous ideologically founded disputes about what 
rules should be applied, the development of the structural policy after the 
nineties shows that the problems concerning complementary spending 
was still dominant in this decade. The dispute about whether structural 
funds were strictly reserved regional development, or could be used as 
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VAT reimbursement mechanism still applied in the late nineties and even 
further. This contestation of the institutionally enacted rules demonstrates 
that, though the structural policy had been much improved in terms of 
ideology, some member states did still regard the received revenues as a 
national matter/benefit. 
 
Concentration  
The principle of concentration represents a minor victory to the 
Commission. The successful adoption of 5 (later 6) objectives replaced the 
last quota-system- thinking, effectively changing the discussion from 
revolving around which member states should get what, to which types of 
regions or segments of population, that should receive financial support. 
Still, this change wasn’t complete, as member states made exceptions and 
demanded periods of exceptional financing, in order to phase out areas 
loosing their eligibility for funding. The successful strategy of the cohesion 
countries at the Nice summit in 1999, in which Structural policy was 
retained exempted from the qualified majority voting rules valid in the 
Council of ministers, marked a setback to the Commission, as necessary 
reforms will be harder to agree after the enlargement, securing this group 
of countries their current benefits in the future. 
 
These four examples of rule contesting behaviour clearly demonstrate the 
stirring animosity toward some aspects of the institutional ideology of 
1989. Still, the description of these conflicts does not sufficiently account 
for all factors, leading to the further institutional development. 
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Besides the rule contestation there are other aspects, contributing to the 
unstable development. The lack of, what one may label an enlargement 
perspective, has in the recent years turned out to be a considerable problem. 
The construction is not geared to obtaining and dealing with a conveying 
of ten new poor countries, and the “old” member states have taken a 
position where they are fighting to protect their own interests. This trend 
may in the longer run undermine the structural policy, if the aim still is 
the promotion and support of EU-policies in regions that are not capable 
to participate, due to large disparities between the European regions. We 
must therefore conclude that a reform seemingly appropriate for the EU-
12/15 isn’t fitting to EU-25. 
 
The supposition is confirmed by the actions of the member states, 
following the decision of enlargement was taken: While the newly enacted 
cohesion fund sets down a very idealistic agenda of the Union’s scope of 
commitment and the Union at the same time admits membership to ten 
states whose under developed  or at times ruined economic and political 
systems may require an incalculable effort and assistance, member states 
react to this extensive interventionist community program, by the only 
mean at their disposal; by adopting a full stop budgetary ceiling of 1.27 % 
of European GDP. (As a reform of the structural policy is unattainable, as 
long as the cohesion group persist). 
 
The changed preferences of the member states did for sure not pass 
unnoticed. The Commission’s proposals became less progressive, to a 
larger degree reflecting the rising scepticism towards the supranational 
administration of the funds as well as to the contributive capacity and 
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willingness of the net-payers. However, despite the changed political 
atmosphere and the financial management crisis, the budgetary prospect 
has notably, overall, kept remarkable traces from its original character, 
from the creation II phase, the first Delors period. 
 
Summarising 
What is left on the bottom-line from the foregoing analysis, is that Jacques 
Delors as a strong Commission President carried out a successful 
reformation of the area of the regional policy. He accomplished to mediate 
member states interests and by that achieving a significant increase of the 
budget which to a high degree benefited the Structural Funds and at the 
same time he gained influence to the Commission by the Community 
Initiatives. 
But what he did not succeeded was to change the attitude of member 
states concerning the budget, as the way the budget is negotiated persist, 
which keep  regional policy dependent on the willingness of the member 
states. They stay as actors which act from a national perspective to gain as 
much as possible to their country from the institutional framework in 
connection to the regional policy and by that they protect their self-
interests.  
 
6.6 – Conclusion 
 
This historical, rational-choice inspired analysis has shown how the 
structural funds has developed due to institutional contestation and 
contemporary political circumstance, since its creation in 1975 and 
onwards. The analysis has demonstrated how the development is best 
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understood as an unfolding incremental and gradual process, evolving 
both through historical bargains (creation phases) and in the intervals 
between. 
The scope of the analysis has been to track the development of the 
structural policy as an effect of the initial institutional settings, in order to 
identify essential embedded elements and determine how institutional 
relations affect interaction of actors involved in creating and operating the 
policy. 
 
The two periods show very different characteristics, each important when 
trying to grasp the driving logic behind the development of structural 
policy. The first period consist of a gradual construction of the structural 
policy, characterized by intergovernmental tiffs over the division of funds, 
whereas the second period can be said to show the deconstruction of 
Community policy as financial crisis makes the distributional question 
resurgent. 
 
Actors 
The institutional interaction has clearly influenced the actors’ preferences. 
There is a qualitative shift, evident when comparing the initial positions of 
actors involved in setting up the policy in the mid-seventies and their 
attitude toward the policy [today]. Not hereby said that their 
opinion/ideology has changed, but the general orientation can be said to 
have shifted from a short-term view, concerning the concrete distribution 
of funds toward a longer-term strategy concerning the ideological content 
of the policy, rather than the immediate obtainable benefits. 
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This shift in orientation toward a more qualified approach signals an 
increased seriousness, which is particularly intensified after the era of 
Delors, underlining the central role of the Commission. Though the unity 
in the coalition of actors proved only temporary it still was sufficient, as it 
allowed the Commission to thicken the institutional framework (of rules).  
However, the analysis has demonstrated how opposing structural forces 
still influences the policy process, generating problems defying a future 
harmonious development.  
A) The continuously accession of 19 new member states since 
the original enactment of structural/regional policy has hampered the 
process of reaching a common benchmark, as new preferences are 
constantly added, preventing the constitution of a permanent point of 
equilibrium and actors, not part of the enacting coalition has an incitement 
to contest the rules in order to make their preferences present. 
B) The absent notion of basic values and ideas in the original 
enacted institution meant that the prevailing conception of the funds 
remained throughout its history. The compensation aspect thought is 
clearly still very dominant, both conspicuous through the member states 
perception of directing the funds uncontested by the Union and the will to 
continuously use the funds as sweeteners in intergovernmental bargains. 
    
The role of the Commission 
Commission: As noted above, the Commission has a decisive impact on 
the structural policy in several ways. This statement is most apparent 
during the period of Delors, which lead us to hypothesize some general 
principles about the role of the Commission in the area of structural 
policy: 
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A) The Commission has definite preferences, different from the 
remaining actors, as the Commission interest lies in a community 
perspective of generating common solutions. This interest is put into 
practise in different ways. In the early years, the Commission saw its own 
role as being the guardian of intergovernmental agreements, while they 
subtly tried to modify the policy. During Delors, it took an active role in 
defining the structural policy, mostly by centralizing the implementation 
process. 
B) The structural policy can be successfully extended in the 
case of a strong Commission, enable of facilitating unity in the coalition of 
actors. Still, this unity is only interim, as it allows the Commission to 
reshape the policy through the presentation of a polity idea, describing the 
further development of the Union in normative terms encompassing most 
of the existing opinions and views. This polity idea is fragile and 
potentially unstable, as it contains contesting elements, which excludes 
and antagonizes each other.  
C) The Commission’s success was conditioned by the exclusion 
of central issues, such as an ideological foundation32, agreements 
regarding a financial settlement33 and the prospect of enlargement34, which 
came to show in the following operationally conflicts between the member 
states and the Commission. On the other hand, the Commission could 
bring its influence to bear in other aspects35 
D) One of the most influential steps taken by the Commission 
has been establishment of the link between structural policy and the 
contemporary greater goals of the Union, ensuring that the structural 
                                                 
32 Creation phase 1 
33 Creation phase 2 
34 Creation phase 2 
35 E.g.: The quadrupled budget, the centralized administrative reform  
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policy hold legitimacy and making it harder to criticize. The seamy side of 
this arrangement is the cost associated with shifting from one objective to 
another36. 
 
The stability of the structural policy 
This analysis has retraced the development back to its point of origin in 
order to demonstrate how the institutional design affects the future 
choices available to the actors. As a conclusive remark, the overall 
institutional arrangement can be assessed in terms of stability, summing 
up previous statement accounted for. 
The existence of the structural policy as a concept remains firm, historical 
embedded in the mind of relevant actors and present in the form of an 
institutional apparatus capable of providing solutions to specific 
problems. Despite of the attempts of the member states to regain control 
over the policy, the basic principles and the extended budget are still valid 
elements, proving the deeply rooted establishment of the policy. 
On the other hand the durability of the concrete content in the policy is far 
more dubious. Contesting financial quarrels has repeatedly spilled into the 
structural policy, making it subordinate to the financial unresolved 
settlement in the Union.  
Likewise, the purpose of the funds has changed several times throughout 
its history, which leads to hesitations about the permanency of the current 
objectives. 
 
 
                                                 
36 E.g.: The cohesion countries claim on a substantial part of the funds, the British 
indemnification. 
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CHAPTER 7 – SOCIOLOGICAL INST. ANALYSIS___ 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Allen (Wallace 2005:215) states that ’It is the member governments which script 
the cohesion ’play’ … even though the European Commission and a variety of 
regional and local actors make much of their particular roles, and their 
interpretation of the meaning and purpose of these plays.’ Hence, it is emphasized 
that the Member States determine the development of the Regional Policy, and 
that there is an absence of an overall goal with this development. The following 
analysis will take its vantage point in looking into the overall ideas behind the 
Regional Policy, focusing on what mechanisms might influence this institution in 
the future. 
 
In the interviews conducted with officials from the Commission and the Council 
respectively, many elements and concepts are mentioned in trying to frame and 
describe the Regional Policy as it looks now, and how it has changed in a time 
period of twenty-five years. These concepts signify economic terms, EU-
institutions, different goals for the policy, means to achieve these goals, as well as 
concrete policy papers and concrete events that all facilitate a description of the 
development of EU’s Regional Policy. In order to understand the way these 
concepts affect each other and the institution, it is necessary to categorize them in 
a logical manner - otherwise they will merely constitute a description of what is 
inside the institution, instead of giving an impression of how the institutional 
design is affected by exogenous and endogenous elements, and vice versa. 
 
7.2 Categorization of elements 
In the following attempt to categorize and systemize these elements and concepts, 
the vantage point will be two overall tendencies; the Cohesion policy and the 
Lisbon strategy, that some of our interviewees mention as their description of the 
development of the Regional Policy in the time period in focus, and which the rest 
 110
of the interviewees sign up to by mentioning other concepts that support the 
notion that these two tendencies are important cursors in the development up until 
now. 
 
7.2.1 – Two competing ideas: Cohesion policy & Lisbon Strategy 
Several of our interviewees emphasize the Cohesion policy as an important 
element in the Regional Policy. At the same time, they all mention the Lisbon 
Strategy - as passed by the European Council in 2000 - as a new and influential 
instrument or policy program for the Regional Policy. The overall aim of the 
Lisbon Strategy has been to promote growth and employment in the Union in 
various ways, thus not as such, a new strategy for the Regional Policy. Yet, it has 
been decided that a certain amount of the projects initiated under the auspices of 
Regional Policy, should adhere to the policies of the Lisbon Strategy, and thus the 
Regional Policy itself becomes a vehicle for achieving certain well-defined goals 
(Dufeil, app. X:4). 
These two elements - referred to as ‘cohesion’ and ‘Lisbon’, respectively - could 
be labelled, either as part of the same paradigm in the Regional Policy institution, 
or as two distinct paradigms, and this relation is important to clarify. Yet, before 
proceeding to a discussion of the relation between them, a definition of the two 
will be necessary. 
  
The Cohesion Policy 
It is clear, that ‘cohesion’ from the beginning37 has been a goal for the Regional 
Policy. Social and Economic Cohesion is formulated as a goal in the Treaty of 
Rome, and this phrasing has persisted in the Treaties over time. It is less clear 
though, what ‘cohesion’ really means, and not least how it is assumed that this 
rather abstract goal could be attained. Rossbacher describes the Cohesion thought 
as a way of encompassing a lot of different policies, spending money on all sorts 
of projects, while Dufeil describes the time before the Lisbon Strategy as having 
only one goal, which was less efficient (Rossbacher, app.X:7; Dufeil, app.X:4). 
The notion of solidarity is also connected to ‘cohesion’, as a way of describing the 
                                                 
37 ‘The beginning’ is from 1975  
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intentions behind the Regional Policy; that this policy field is, or has been, 
characterized by a will to give aid to the poorest regions in the Union (Michelis, 
app.X:7).   
Logically, the Cohesion policy can also be linked to what Michelis talks of as ‘the 
regional element’, meaning the part of the Regional Policy oriented towards 
developing the regions, and not just distributing funds on the basis of quotas or 
objective measures (Michelis, app.X:1) 
 
The Lisbon Strategy  
When talking of the Lisbon Strategy, the interviewees make a point of the strategy 
itself as a policy paper, and what it contains in practise. Yet, the notion of 
‘Lisbon’ can also be seen as a metaphor for a political tendency in the Regional 
Policy, and therefore it should not be understood strictly as a set of rules 
implemented at a certain point in time. 
Overall, the strategy can be said to embed some changes in the institutional 
framework of the Regional Policy, by establishing some new tools for 
implementing the policy, and additionally it defines some political goals for the 
Union as a whole, goals such as growth, employment and competitiveness, that 
also apply to the Regional Policy. Dufeil explains the strategy as a way of 
strengthening a Europe ‘confronted with the worldwide competition, confronted 
with the competition in the US, in Japan, in the new emerging economies’ (Dufeil, 
app. X: 4) 
With the Lisbon strategy, the element of solidarity and the regional element from 
the Cohesion thought, according to Michelis, are somewhat in danger, because of 
a lack of programming and control (Michelis, app.X:1).  
 
7.2.2 – Two paradigms or a paradigm-program pair? 
One possibility of interpreting the roles of the Cohesion thought and the Lisbon 
strategy in the institution is to see them as one program idea coherent to one 
paradigm. In this perspective, the Cohesion idea is a paradigm that withholds 
throughout the whole period in focus, and the Lisbon strategy is a program idea 
appearing relatively late in this period.  
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This assumption is supported by DK 1 and Dufeil, both stating that the Lisbon 
idea is a tool for a better achievement of already defined goals, and that there is no 
inconsistency between the two (DK 1, app.X:13; Dufeil, app.X:4). Indirectly, 
Michelis gives a similar statement when toning down the influence of the Lisbon 
Strategy when it is implemented in practise; his point is, that Member States have 
ceded very weak instruments to the Commission, and ‘precisely because it is 
based on intergovernmental processes it simply does not work’ (Michelis, 
app.X:6). 
 
Yet, another possibility is to view the two elements as opposed to each other - as 
elements in an antagonistic relation, wherein the co-existence of both spurs off 
fights over the domain of, in this case the Regional Policy institution. This is what 
Rossbacher describes, when he talks of the two groupings in DG Regio as ‘the 
cohesion guys’ and the ‘Lisbon guys’, where the former is in a state of decline due 
to an overall change in the background assumptions that determine what policies 
can be implemented (Rossbacher, app.X:4). Further, he talks of ‘two different 
lanes, different speeds, you have cohesion policies, and on the other side, in the 
objective 2 this is more Lisbonized, more focused and contemplated.’ 
(Rossbacher, app. X:8). This accentuates that the two ideas co-exist in the current 
design of the Regional Policy, but that they are fundamentally different. 
Rossbacher also talks of the role of the cohesion element in the most recent 
enlargement negot3iations, meaning that the view of the Regional Policy as a way 
of helping weaker economies was predominant in this period (Rossbacher, 
app.X:4). This again describes the two ideas as co-existent, although this 
statement does not necessarily entail that there is an antagonistic relation between 
the two. 
 
There is good reasoning behind the view of the two elements as a logic sequence 
of policies or as a paradigm and a corresponding program idea. However, the 
argument for labelling the Lisbon Strategy as merely a program idea mostly rests 
on the evident observation that the Lisbon Strategy is in fact a policy program, 
officially adopted by the institution. But regarding the legitimizing factors in the 
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institution, in order to adopt a program idea, this also has to be consistent with the 
public sentiment at the time (or at least the assumptions about the public 
sentiment), and when looking into the reasoning behind the Lisbon Strategy, as 
Michelis does, the compromise between the Commission and Council bears 
witness of some more fundamental changes in basic assumptions about how to 
address common issues, than described in relation to the Cohesion policy 
(Michelis, app.-:8). The public sentiment - which is understood as the sentiment 
of the Member States - represents a lack of willingness to engage in the 
community project, and a willingness to deregulate. It is thus possible to view the 
Lisbon Strategy as more than a policy paper, that is, as a metaphor for a general 
shift or gradual transition in the way things are done in the institution. 
Also keeping in mind, that even if the Lisbon Strategy merely represents a bunch 
of tools for attaining the same goal as in the good old days of Cohesion, the two 
frames of thought are characterized by quite different articulated problems and 
solutions, and they limit the range of alternatives that are seen as useful for 
attaining the goals of Regional Policy. The following paragraphs will illustrate 
this schism, assuming that the Lisbon idea constitutes a paradigm as well, and 
afterwards different reasons for the change of paradigm in the Regional Policy, 
will be discussed.  
 
7.2.3 – Tendencies in the development of the Regional Policy 
institution  
As already mentioned, there is a general consensus amongst the interviewees that 
a change has happened, or at least that there is a gradual transition towards a more 
Lisbonized frame of mind in Regional Policy. 
This transition which they all describe in different ways, is characterized by an 
inclusion and exclusion of elements from the institution, in addition to attempts to 
change the meaning of some of these elements. In the following paragraphs, these 
processes will be examined by deducing from the interview material some pairs of 
opposite concepts that the different interviewees articulate.  
The different elements that can be included or excluded from the institution at 
certain points in time, are not necessarily attached to either the Cohesion 
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paradigm or the Lisbon paradigm as such - they merely depict the development in 
relations between the Council and the Commission, a relation that has a great 
impact on what programs can be carried out, and what ideas can be embedded in 
the institution.  
 
7.2.3.1 – Allocation or Redistribution? 
Two of the interviewees - Michelis and DK2 - operate with a distinction between 
the concepts of ‘allocation’ and ‘redistribution’ as to describe differences in the 
idea behind the Regional Policy when it comes to the overall distribution of funds. 
Michelis defines the allocative element of cohesion policy as founded on the 
rationale that it is not simply a question of transferring resources to member 
states, but to transfer resources with “certain conditions attached to them”. The 
Regional Policy in other words, is not about supporting national revenues, which 
has never been the objective (Michelis, app.X:1).  DK2 uses slightly different 
terms to describe the difference between the two directions that the regional 
policy can move in - in fact, he uses the term ‘reallocation’ as equal to what 
Michelis calls redistribution.  
 
Nevertheless, they agree upon the fact that in these years, the Regional Policy is 
divided between two main ideas of how the goals of economic and social 
cohesion should be obtained: one idea involves the element of simple 
redistribution of the contributions from Member States, back to the Member 
States, as what could be called ‘side payments’. This means, that the Community 
has no role in the process of planning what the money is spent for. The second 
idea, involving the ‘allocation’ element  is more demanding of the Community, in 
that it involves a process of long-term planning, and at least on account of 
Michelis, this approach is characterized by having a final goal of balancing out the 
differences in the Union - as opposed to the redistributive idea, that only relates to 
the amount of funds conveyed by member states at a given moment.  
 
DK2 emphasizes the element of ‘compensation’ as being consistent with the 
simple redistribution of funds. However, ‘compensation’ can be understood in 
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different ways. Compensation or side-payments in this regard is an indicator of a 
certain element of solidarity, since they are the side-payments; ”necessary to 
make Southern Europe or Eastern Europe able to take part in different kinds of 
market liberalization, then it is necessary to compensate some of the areas that 
will be affected by these sorts of things”  (DK2, app.X: 3. (Own translation)). 
DK2 interprets ’compensation’ with a slightly different meaning in distinguishing 
between compensation as ‘side payments’ or as ‘solidarity’ , the latter being 
different from the ‘intergovernmental package deals’ that almost all of the 
interviewees describe as characterizing the budget negotiations. (Michelis, app. 
X:8 ; DK1, app.X: 10; DK2, app.X: 5; Rossbacher, app.X:3). 
Michelis is in no doubt, as to what direction the Regional Policy is heading: 
“the policy is reinforcing its distributive character and losing its allocative 
element and this goes more in the direction of a policy that is a simple transfer 
from the Community budget to the budgets of member states” (Michelis, app.X:2)  
He emphasizes, that the regional and the allocative element are disappearing from 
the Regional Policy, in favour of a ‘very simple financial mechanism’, and he 
suggests that if this is what the Community really wants, this policy area should 
not go under the name of ‘structural’ or ‘cohesion’ policy, but instead it should 
just be called ‘micro economic financing’ (Michelis, app.X:5). 
“I think we are getting there where the decision needs to be taken, whether the 
territorial dimension, the regional dimension, the investment bank dimension are 
what matters, or if it is the co-financing of the national budget that 
matters.”(Michelis, app.X:6).  
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7.2.3.2 –  Conecentration or Dispersion of Funds? 
Another divide in the Regional Policy is between the idea of concentrating the 
funds towards the poorest regions in the Union, and the idea of creating a policy 
aimed at all member countries. This is where the so-called ‘statistical element’ 
plays a part, because this strife has emerged as a consequence of the latest 
enlargements, where the former poorest countries and regions according to 
regulations no longer belong in the objective 1 group, and therefore are no longer 
entitled to receive funds as before. 
This discussion also relates to the question of solidarity, since there is a certain 
element of unfairness in the way funds are distributed, because they to a large 
extent are distributed also to the richest countries in the Union. In a time where 
the gap between rich and poor countries in the European Union is larger than ever, 
this kind of policy could seem inappropriate in relation to the goal of ‘social and 
economic cohesion’. 
DK2 states that the idea of ‘cohesion’ in itself involves a policy that encompasses 
the whole Union, and not only the poorest countries, and that there is a need for 
certain widespread policies in terms of infrastructure across borders, and the like. 
Therefore, when member states strive towards a policy with ‘something for 
everybody’, it really is no wonder (DK2, app.X:3). But, as he says, if Regional 
Policy on the other hand is simply meant to be a redistributive policy, involving 
elements of compensation, a natural consequence hereof would in fact be to 
distribute the funds only to the poorest regions in the Union, in order to level out 
economic disparities (DK2, app.X:4). 
Michelis says in relation to this that maybe ‘the notion of solidarity is no longer 
popular’, and this could be the explanation for a shift from a dominating 
‘concentration’ element, towards a wider distribution of funds. 
The different views of how to distribute the funds are of course associated with 
specific actors. DK2 points to the fact that while some members agree on the 
concentration element, the ’old poor’ countries try to encourage the idea of 
’something for everybody’, since they have a natural interest in keeping their own 
benefits (DK2, app.X:2). At the same time, the Commission has had a general 
interest in the concentration-strategy, Michelis states. (Michelis, app.X:4) 
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Nevertheless, the acceptance of the Lisbon Strategy makes clear that Regional 
Policy is about competitiveness throughout the Union, and thus a ‘something for 
everybody’-strategy, as suggested by DG Regio in 1999 (Peterson & Bomberg, : 
). 
 
7.2.3.3 – Liberalization or Public Investments? 
In connection to the above discussion is the question of what macro-economic 
idea the Regional Policy could be said to adhere to. In her analysis of the 
Cohesion Policy from 1998, Hooghe focuses on the two dominating schools at the 
time, which she labels ‘regulated capitalism’ and ‘neo-liberalism’. She 
emphasizes that other scholars have different labels characterizing this ideological 
divide - in this analysis we will accordingly distinguish between the instruments 
characterizing the two current dominating ideas, that is ‘liberalization’ versus 
‘public investments’ (Michelis, app.X:8). 
In relation to the shift from the cohesion paradigm towards the Lisbon paradigm, 
the liberalization-element has become more influential. This is first of all reflected 
in the lack of will of central planning, which does not in itself constitute a change 
in the dominating macro-economic idea - yet, it automatically entails a more 
liberalized or decentralised approach, which is not characterized by productive 
long-term Community investments, but rather, a policy of simple money 
transferring to the regions that are perceived as being eligible for funding at a 
certain moment (Michelis, app.X:5). 
In this regard, the Sapir report is described as marking a shift towards more 
liberalization; it was presented as a solution to making the EU more competitive, 
and even though the report was never transformed into a concrete implementable 
program, Rossbacher says that this was a time where people realized, that 
“something is changing” (Rossbacher, app.X:4). 
 
With the Sapir Report it was questioned whether the Regional Policy was really 
the best way of promoting competitiveness, growth and job creation for the Union 
- thereby a new standard was set for what this institution was supposed to 
produce. Even though the Sapir Report was presented after the Lisbon Strategy 
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had been put into practice - and even though it encompasses some measures of 
liberalization that the Lisbon Strategy not even deals with - it definitely fits with 
the tendencies of what we call the ‘Lisbon paradigm’, in that it takes a step away 
from the four principles of the reform of 1988, and is rather focused on a de-
bureaucratization of the institution.  
 
Henceforth, there have been attempts to prove that Regional Policy is a relevant 
element in the attainment of the goal of competitiveness, employment and growth, 
or as Rossbacher puts it, to relabel the policy by arguing that regional policy has 
always been a Lisbon Policy, and has always been oriented towards e.g. job 
creation (Rossbacher, app.X:4). Michelis, on a personal note, argues that the 
Regional Policy is in fact supporting the same goals as in the Lisbon strategy 
(Michelis, app.X:7). 
Summing up, the tendency points towards a more ‘economic’ frame of mind, 
where the question of overall efficiency in the Union becomes a top priority. As 
Rossbacher says it, despite the fact that social cohesion is still a goal “the 
economy is one of the driving forces now”. Therefore, centralization and long-
term planning become less legitimate tools for achieving the goals of the Regional 
Policy (Rossbacher, app.X:8). 
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7.2.3.4 – Transparency or Flexibility? 
Another point where two different elements are pulling the policy in two different 
directions, is regarding the implementation of the Regional Policy after agreeing 
how it should be shaped. 
Different schisms are at play here, illustrating the relation between the dominating 
EU-institutions in Regional Policy. One of these is illustrated well by the four 
principles from 1988; especially the principle of additionality reveals a great deal 
about the different polity ideas. This principle is understood as a demand that the 
national economies spend money from Structural or Cohesion funds on purposes 
additional to those already on the national agenda, thus complementing instead of 
replacing national regional policy - it emphasizes, that Regional Policy is more 
than a subsidy, and is an important tool for the Commission, since it illustrates 
that the Regional Policy is a common policy and not just a bunch of different 
policies gaining support from the Union, as it was before the reform in 1988 
(Hooghe, 1998:459).  Additionally, the Commission has introduced the principle 
of ‘earmarking’, in relation to the Lisbon Strategy, meaning that a certain amount 
of projects should adhere to the Lisbon goals. But according to Michelis, because 
the Lisbon Strategy is based on intergovernmental processes, these principles do 
not work in practise (Michelis, app. X:6). 
Especially Michelis accentuates the tendency towards less transparency in the 
implementation processes, in spite of the principle of additionality. The ‘strategic 
guidance framework’ is in his view a watered down document, where all kinds of 
projects can in principle be fit into, and the Community has no possibility of 
knowing what projects are being initiated in the member countries - as Michelis 
points out, when you want to know what is being implemented under the auspices 
of Regional Policy in, say, Poland, you need to go through the Polish operational 
programme written in Polish to understand what is being financed (Michelis, 
app.:6). 
The ear-marking attempt has also failed, according to Michelis, because with the 
broad goals of Lisbon Strategy, the member states argue that everything is in 
some way Lisbon-related (Michelis, app.: 7). Rossbacher agrees on this point of 
view, but also has the perception that the reason why the policy is at the time so 
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dispersed, and the member states are not willing to cooperate, is in fact due to the 
many layers of control - if there was more autonomy in the implementation 
process, maybe the policy would be more effective (Rossbacher, app.X:9). 
Michelis on his side goes against this view by indicating that in the current state 
of a very weak Community system and a dominant intergovernmental system, if 
the member states do not wish to engage in a discussion about the instruments 
needed to improve accountability and transparency of the way the money is used, 
“there is nothing the Commission can do” (Michelis, app.: 4). 
 
7.2.3.5 – Shared or National Policy?  
Many of the above discussions revolve around a rather simple discussion on 
whether the Regional Policy is perceived as a common policy or a system made to 
support various national projects. The principle of subsidiarity can be highlighted 
in this regard, since it illustrates the divide on this subject; on the one hand, the 
principle of subsidiarity can be interpreted by the member states as an argument 
that the Commission should only have limited influence on their way of 
conducting regional policy. On the other hand, the principle of subsidiarity leads 
to the conclusion, that since Regional Policy involves transnational, regional and 
structural elements, there is a pay-off in cooperating on regional policy areas, and 
should thus be solved as a shared policy (DK2, app.X:3).  
 
The way that most commentators describe the Regional Policy, indicate that 
member states generally seek to maintain it as a number of individual, nationally 
founded projects with support from the Community. At the same time the 
Commission pulls in a different direction, by establishing strategies for a common 
plan for the policy - what Michelis calls ’structural policy’ (Michelis, app.X:5). 
Despite the attempts in the reform of 1988 to institutionalize Regional Policy and 
thereby keep it on the Community level, Michelis’ assessment of the current 
situation is, that ”it is still perceived as a net return on national budgets and not 
as a shared policy but a national policy. Full stop. (…) at the end of the day the 
way to look at the policy is through the redistributive value… you redistribute 
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money, give a blank check, you sign, the Commission signs and that’s it.” 
(Michelis, app.: 4) 
 
7.2.4  Summary of tendencies 
To sum up briefly, the shift in the paradigmatic Cohesion-Lisbon schism can be 
characterized from five tendencies appearing from the above discussion of the five 
pairs of conflicting elements.  
 
First of all, there has been a shift away from a Cohesion paradigm, with a focus 
on its reallocative element. This has been dependent on more central planning and 
administration at Community level, and formulates a defined goal. The Lisbon 
paradigm enhances the redistributional element of the regional policy. Bringing 
the meaning of redistribution to a head, it entails nothing but a ‘simple financial 
mechanism’, with a goal of little more than compensating the member states for 
any possible inconveniences of being in an ever-integrating Union, hereby 
returning some of the revenues back to the member states. Secondly, this has 
resulted in a much less transparent use of the financial means, thus impeding the 
pursuit of an overall, common goal for the Regional Policy. Thirdly, despite the 
Commission’s attempt to concentrate the funding on the most needed regions, the 
Lisbon paper is a ‘something for everybody’- strategy, thus, there still exists a 
relative38 high dispersion of financial means between the member states. This 
dispersion is, as noted, characterized by simple financial redistribution, leading to 
the fourth tendency; the overall turn-away from public investments towards a 
liberalization of the EU budget. The Sapir report (launched but not fully accepted) 
in 2004, represented the Lisbon paradigm in its purest form yet, directly 
contesting the raison d’etre of the Regional Policy.  
 
These four major tendencies can in sum be characterized as an overall shift from a 
notion of the Regional Policy as a shared policy and towards a ‘national’ policy, 
from cohesion to Lisbon, …These considerations constitute important meta-
                                                 
38Seen in the light of the accession of the 10 new, relatively poor countries, who should 
statistically, by cohesion objectives, be receiving the bulk part of the funds. 
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analytical tools for the next part of the analysis, in which we look for the reasons 
behind the change in paradigms. 
 
7.3 – Reasons for the Shift in Paradigms 
Until now, we have primarily focused on the overall tendencies in the 
development of the Regional Policy in terms of paradigms and program ideas. We 
have looked into what elements constitute the current ‘Lisbon’-paradigm, in 
opposition to the vanishing Cohesion-paradigm, and finally discussed what this 
tells us about the overall development of the economic paradigm of the Union as a 
whole. However, this only gives a narrow insight in the institutional mechanisms 
at work in the Regional Policy. In order to convey a conclusion of the dynamics 
that drive forward the development in this institution, it will therefore be 
necessary, in the following paragraphs, to illustrate more specifically, how 
institutional dynamics affect on the Regional Policy, and thereby, what has set off 
this paradigm shift. 
 
According to Campbell, the replacement of an old paradigm with a new one, 
stems from a need for a new solution to a problem, that cannot otherwise be 
resolved (Campbell, 2002:24). Torfing explains such a shift as a ‘structural crisis 
where old is dying and new has not yet been born’ (Torfing, 2001:281). 
Therefore, when examining the possible reasons for a shift of paradigms, it seems 
reasonable to look for the articulation of problems, and at the same time indicators 
that there is or has been a need to find a new way of dealing with this problem. In 
the following paragraphs, we point to three factors that have been decisive for the 
paradigmatic change in the Regional Policy, and finally, we discuss what this tells 
us about the institution in focus. 
 
7.3.1 – A change in the public sentiment 
One of the causes of the shifting of paradigm from a Cohesion-driven policy 
towards a Lisbon-policy can be traced back to changes within the institution itself. 
What characterizes the time period that has been in focus throughout this analysis, 
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can in part be described as changes in the public sentiment; understood either as 
changes in the inter-institutional relations with regard to Regional Policy, as well 
as changes in the way the institution as a whole perceives the public sentiment at 
the time. 
 
Framing program ideas: The importance of a strong Commission 
The Council has at some points been a metaphor for an intergovernmental forum 
with representatives from 12, 15 or 25 countries, and at other times, as Michelis 
expresses it, been able to constitute itself as an institution. This entails a 
difference in the degree of confidence in the Commission and support for the 
Community project as a whole (Michelis, app.X: 3; Dufeil, app.X: 6). Especially 
when it comes to the question of implementation of the policies, where issues of 
subsidiarity, additionality, transparency and flexibility come up, it is possible to 
see the changes over time in the public sentiment - which the member states 
represent in this case - towards more or less centralization, and thereby what kinds 
of policies will gain legitimacy. When comparing the two paradigms, an obvious, 
is that a strong Commission with the ability to frame programs in a goal-oriented 
manner, gains legitimacy from the Council. What characterized the Cohesion-
paradigm, was the ability of the Commission to do exactly this (Michelis, 
app.X:10; Rossbacher, app.X: 8), while the Lisbon-paradigm - at least when 
looking at the methods taken into use - is rather characterized by a need to find 
new ways of coordinating Regional Policy, and thus represents a step away from 
the common policy and towards an intergovernmental method. 
 
It is evident, that the policy that derived from the Cohesion paradigm, as framed 
by the Delors Commission, had its advantages namely when it came to framing. 
The different elements of the Cohesion policy were put together as an attempt to 
legitimize a specific policy that Delors and the DG Regio at the time, had in mind. 
The fact that it gained legitimacy, can to a great extent be ascribed to the ability of 
the Commission to pave the way for a specific policy, that was not necessarily 
accepted by the member states due to its exact content or degree of effectiveness 
(Dufeil, app.X:12; DK2, app.X:10, Rossbacher, app.X: 8).  
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An important point in this respect is, that once decided upon, a policy will be 
maintained even though these inter-institutional relations change. This means, that 
when the grand ideologists behind the Cohesion policy slowly began to be 
replaced, the support by member states of the policy might have vanished as well, 
because the people who replaced them were not as keen on this polity idea as their 
predecessors (Rossbacher, app.X:8). Additionally, as Hooghe points out, when the 
shared Regional Policy did not seem to have the capacity to solve problems more 
effectively than the national approaches “the effectiveness and efficiency of EU 
cohesion policy have come under severe scrutiny” (Hooghe, 1998:464). This 
leads to an increasing need to legitimize the institution. 
 
Framing the institution: The goal of visibility towards the citizens 
This legitimization is also needed with respect to the European citizens as such, 
meaning that the Regional Policy institution, including both Commission and 
Council, have certain ways of framing the Regional Policy in a way as to gain 
legitimacy from the European citizens. This can be done implicitly by sharing a 
common perception of the success stories of EU’s Regional Policy, or by 
branding the Regional Policy as “the one policy field where Europe is the most 
visible for the people.”(Rossbacher, app.X:11). 
The economic triumph of Ireland is a good example of one of these success 
stories, where the Regional Policy has been involved as a main factor (Dufeil, 
app: 9). Ireland was suffering from poverty and under-development  before 
joining the Union, but due to a very focused use of structural funding, Ireland is 
now amongst the net-contributors to the budget (DK1, app.X:1; Dufeil, app. X: 9). 
Michelis attaches this to the allocative dimension of the policy, where a 
longsighted funding-strategy has been applied (Michelis, app.X:4). 
 
The notion of ’visibility’ also gives an impression of how this institution works.  
All the interviewees at some point mention the fact that the Regional Policy has a 
strong relevance in conveying the idea of European integration (Dufeil, app.X:1), 
in that the concrete projects and programs are in fact visible to the European 
citizens. This means, that when the European Union’s flag is physically attached 
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to the real-life co-financed projects of Regional Policy - bridges, buildings, roads 
and so on - the citizens become aware of the Union and what their money is in 
fact spent on, and this creates an added value that in itself legitimizes the 
institution towards the rest of the Union, at the same time as giving legitimacy to 
the Union in the face of its citizens. This value might not have been intended from 
the beginning - at least, it has not been the main goal of the policy - but it makes it 
worthwhile to maintain the institution in the long run. 
 
Thus, if presuming that the goal of visibility has been embedded in the institution, 
although not having been a goal officially decided upon - it makes sense, that the 
development of the Regional Policy is going in a direction where there is 
something for everybody, since it is crucial that the policy is carried out in many 
different regions, including those of the net-contributors, instead of concentrating 
them on the indeed n parts of the Union, to make sure that as many citizens as 
possible acquaint with this aspect of the European community. 
In this view, the institution is more oriented towards legitimizing its own 
existence than achieving commonly accepted goals. This is of course also 
triggered by the rather hopeless situation where everyone aims at a common goal, 
but only few are interested in sacrificing the resources needed to actually attain it.  
In fact, it could be argued that this is the most efficient way of spending the very 
limited amount of money at hand. Visibility at least gives the citizens an idea that 
they gain something by being part of the Internal Market, and thereby accordance 
is created between the public sentiment and the program. 
 
The goal of visibility can thus be seen as an example of how meaning is put into 
an already existing institutional context. The Regional Policy as institution does 
not change as a consequence of the visibility-element, but the latter has a 
legitimizing effect on the institution. The way the institution has been shaped as a 
consequence of the relations between the actors inside of it complies with the 
notion of visibility, because this ’something for everybody’-frame of mind 
implicates a widespread dispersion of the funds rather than a concentrated 
targeting at some especially poverished regions. Whether this attained legitimacy 
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can be used as an instrument in the long run to make the member states sacrifice 
more in order to achieve the goal of social and economic cohesion - and move 
towards a ‘some for everyone but a whole lot for the few’-approach, will depend 
on other factors  linked to the efficiency of Regional Policy and the possibility of, 
with more resources at hand, to achieve the high goals of mending the economic 
differences that increasingly characterize the Union. 
  
7.3.2 – An enlarging Union 
A very obvious factor in the change towards a new paradigm in Regional Policy, 
is the recent enlargement of the Union.  To a policy field like the Regional Policy, 
basing itself on redistribution of financial means in the Union, an enlargement of 
course has a great effect, since the economies of new member countries have great 
impact on how to distribute the resources. 
This is especially the case when the new Members are significantly worse off 
economically than the current members, and this was the case both in the eighties 
when Spain, Portugal and Greece became members, and even more so in the 
Eastern enlargement in 2004. 
From a pure intergovernmental logic, what becomes evident when looking at the 
enlargements, is that immediately there does not seem to be any benefits for the 
old member states in incorporating three or twelve new countries in the Union 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001: 50) Some scholars point to this as some sort of an 
unintended consequence, where the very fundamental values upon which the 
Union is based, leads to actions of inclusion; that the Union never says ‘no’ but 
only ‘yes, but’. This entails some moral commitments that cannot be neglected 
afterwards  (Wæver, 2005: 212)  
 
When looking at the Regional Policy as an institution, it could thus be questioned, 
to what degree the enlargements should be seen as a consequence of the will of 
the actors in the institution as such, or if the Regional Policy institution would 
rather have an interest in not having to deal with a bunch of new members.  
At least when considering The Mediterranean Enlargement, it is clear that the 
Regional Policy gained momentum due to the built-in notion of cohesion, and its 
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ability to help the new member states to being able to compete on equal footing 
with the old members - this is at least formulated as a main reason for the 
occurrence of the Cohesion paradigm, by all the interviewees (Michelis, app.X: 1; 
Rossbacher, app.X: 9; Dufeil, app.X: 10; DK 1, app.X:3; DK2, app.X:9) Thus, in 
this case Regional Policy gained from the new members joining the Union - but in 
relation to the perception of the ever-enlarging Union as mentioned above, and 
especially in the case of the Eastern enlargement, the gains seem to have turned 
into rather insurmountable challenges, and the notion of enlargement definitely 
serves as a metaphor of an intrusion from the outside, that the Regional Policy as 
institution has to deal with in order to make ends and ideology meet, as net-
receivers increase by number. 
 
In the beginning, the purpose with Regional Policy thus seems to have been the 
creation of the economic basis for further enlargement (and integration). Even 
though enlargement is not an eternal possibility, the recent enlargement bears 
witness of an identity change in the institution - and in the EU as a whole, for that 
sake - because there has been a change in strategy for the Regional Policy in this 
regard, and the Eastern enlargement has not resulted in a more serious strategy of 
reducing economic disparities. Paradoxically, that the recent enlargement and 
future enlargements seem to be the epitaph for Regional Policy rather than a 
possibility of framing the Cohesion thought once more, and this serves as a 
change in the cognitive assumptions of member states regarding what is realistic. 
 
So what consequences does this pose for the policy as such? Looking at the 
statistical effect as the most illustrating example of the new economic situation 
with regards to regional funding, it is quite clear why especially Spain has been 
fighting for its right to be counted as one of the poor member states. However, 
when the whole purpose of Regional Policy is changing towards a more growth-
by-deregulation oriented strategy, and in a time where the budget has been 
capped, it does not seem fair to assume that any of the poor members will in the 
long run receive the kinds of benefits as Spain, Portugal and Greece did, back 
when the Cohesion paradigm was in its creation phase. 
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DK1 describes the enlargements as plus-sum games for the Union, because in his 
view, everybody benefits from an enlarged number of members. But clearly, with 
the lack of economic support from the old member states, this can only be 
achieved by changing the program (Michelis, app.X:7) In Michelis’ view, as a 
consequence of the Eastern enlargement, the policy is “reinforcing its distributive 
character and losing its allocative element” (Michelis, app.X:1). This clearly 
illustrates the graduate disappearance of the Cohesion paradigm. 
The shifting of paradigms can thus be explained by the fact that the Cohesion 
paradigm with its goals and means - however inconsequently implemented - 
cannot produce an answer to the challenges posed due to the recent enlargement 
of the Union. Thus, the Lisbon strategy - or at least some alternative to the 
Cohesion paradigm - has been a necessity for the Regional Policy’s further 
existence.  
 
7.3.3 – A new meaning of ‘compensation’ 
When first commencing this analysis, one of the goals were to examine whether 
Regional Policy could be described in different terms than as a simple 
compensational mechanism for the member states. Using compensation as a way 
of explaining the attitudes of member states towards Regional Policy, however, 
necessitates an elaboration of what compensation really means. In Campbell’s 
terms, it can be understood as a way of framing a policy in order to gain 
legitimacy from the member states, and thus being able to carry out a specific 
policy program. The historical development of the Regional Policy institution is 
indeed characterized by this sort of framing, as to make the policy acceptable, but 
this has not only been in terms of side-payments or ‘sweeteners’. The above 
analysis of two different enlargements exemplifies that there is - or has been - an 
element of solidarity embedded in Regional Policy, in isolation from individual 
preferences, and this also serves as a kind of compensation, as DK2 emphasizes. 
And even though, as Hooghe points out, framing the Regional Policy as an 
accompanying measure of the Internal Market might also have been a pure trade-
off for the Delors Commission, seeing it as an opportunity to reform the funds, the 
public sentiment at the time was in sync with this trade-off, creating the 
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possibilities for less developed states to move up to the same level of development 
as the rest of the EU countries (Hooghe, 1998:461; Michelis, app.X:5). 
   
Still, in explaining the change in paradigms within Regional Policy, the notion of 
‘compensation’, in whatever of these two interpretations, is not very contributive; 
indeed, the compensating mechanism has been an important element in framing 
and securing the raison d’être of the institution, but this fits well with either 
paradigm.  
When looking at the Lisbon paradigm, and what it entails for the Regional Policy, 
it is possible to trace a new kind of compensation mechanism, put into in a 
strategy for growth and employment. This kind of compensation, however, does 
not work as a compensation for economic contributions to the community - rather, 
it serves as a solution to the problematic consequences of globalization, and thus 
is a compensation for exogenous factors rather than endogenously created 
problems. The tendency towards this is reflected in many of the statements from 
the interviewees, describing how, first of all, Europe is in these years confronted 
with increasing competition from USA and Japan, and secondly, how Regional 
Policy “needs to prove its efficiency” (Dufeil, app.X:4). 
 
The two other sorts of compensation mechanisms were solutions to problems 
created internally in the Union; either a compensation to member states that had 
not been keen on the redistributive aspect of EU policy, or towards new members 
for which the Single Market or the EMU created economic disadvantages 
resulting in even greater economic disparities in the Union as a whole. The kind 
of compensation that the Lisbon paradigm provides for the member states serves 
as a solution to exogenously created problems, in the shape of the very broad term 
of globalization. This puts the Regional Policy in a state where it needs to 
consider  its own identity in relation to the Union as a whole, now that the aim of 
creating economic and social cohesion is no longer the only priority. 
Attempts at this are illustrated by Rossbacher, amongst others, describing how, 
when faced with demands of making 40 % of the Regional Policy projects adhere 
to the Lisbon goals, some state representatives have tried to argue that Regional 
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Policy always has been Lisbon policy, and that i.e. the goal of creating jobs has 
been a policy under DG Regio for a long time (Rossbacher, app.X:8). Dufeil in 
addition to this, explains how the aim is to give “the best value for public money” 
and that “the Regional Policy needs to prove its efficiency now” (Dufeil, app.X:4), 
statements that reflect the way that Regional Policy in these years is being framed 
in order to regain legitimacy, and showing that there are other ends than just 
solidarity in itself.  
All things considered, this the tendency can be characterized as gearing Regional 
Policy to fit into a new paradigm, and it goes towards creating a purpose for the 
institution other than the built-in purpose of creating social and economic 
cohesion; solidarity and redistribution are not goals in themselves, they have to 
pay off, and Regional Policy becomes an instrument to achieve a higher goal. 
 
First of all, the above gives an explanation for the shift in cognitive background 
assumptions about how to solve economic problems or issues - the economic 
challenges for the Union have simply changed, and thereby it seems reasonable to 
find new solutions. The Lisbon paradigm thus serves as a possible successor to the 
Cohesion paradigm, which solely concentrated its efforts towards the internally 
created problems in the Union. 
Additionally, this also marks a change in the normative assumptions about what 
economic idea should guide the further development of the Union as such; due to 
factors such as an expanding amount of member states, a decreasing willingness 
from member states to engage in allocative policies, and the threats posed by 
globalization, it seems that there is a gradual ideological shift towards economic 
tools of deregulation, at the same time as forming a policy with the goal of 
creating ‘compensation for everybody’. As Michelis and DK2 pointed out, this 
strategy has an inbuilt contradiction, because the something for everybody-
approach aimed at challenging the economic threats of globalization needs central 
planning in order to have effect.   
 
But of course, deciding to implement the goals of the Lisbon strategy into 40 % of 
the projects made under the auspices of Regional Policy, does not in itself mean 
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the end of Regional Policy - and taking into account that the Lisbon Strategy as 
such is merely a set of non-binding tools with goals attached to them on which 
everyone can agree, does not mean that the policy of diminishing economic 
disparities in the Union is not legitimate. 
Yet, even though Lisbon is not binding, it gives a realistic impression of the 
relations between proponents of national policies and proponents of shared 
policies at the time of approval. And when taking this weak community interest 
into account, it seems reasonable to conclude, that the issues revealed by the 
Lisbon Strategy to a greater extent reflect the public sentiment than the issues of 
inequality described by a strong Commission some twenty years ago. 
 
 
7.4 – Sub-conclusion 
Some overall points can be made with respect to the above analysis, and the 
introductory objective of this part of the analysis, to ‘interpret the meaning and 
purpose of the play of Regional Policy’ (Chapter 7.1). To further illustrate the 
relation between the two parts of this analysis, the following figure shows how the 
tendencies characterizing the shift in the paradigm 
(determined in the first half of the analysis) are 
discussed in the second half of the analysis, in 
relation to the decisive factors, pointed out by our 
interview persons:  
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First of all, it seems that EU's Regional Policy is moving towards some new goals 
that inherently exclude some of the solutions to the goals that characterize the 
Cohesion paradigm. These new goals pave the way for the Lisbon paradigm, 
characterized by a consensus on how to achieve them. By embedding the goals 
from the Lisbon strategy into the Regional Policy, it is clear, that the old Cohesion 
idea cannot be withheld -  goals such as growth, competitiveness and employment 
do not comply with goals of reducing regional disparities in the Union, if not from 
a purely economic point of view, then from a political view where equality just 
isn’t on the agenda.  
 
Secondly, it is a possible conclusion that the Lisbon paradigm more than the 
Cohesion paradigm embeds some goals that better cohere with the aggregated 
polity ideas of the actors in the Union. That the goal of social and economic 
cohesion was never really an integrated goal in the Regional Policy, it was rather 
a goal that the strong Commission at the time had the ability to go through with. 
When the intergovernmental method increasingly gained momentum - as also 
proved by the Lisbon Strategy, as a symbol or snapshot of the relations between 
the actors at the time - the real ideas of the member states come to the fore, and 
without dealing with who did what first, it is obvious that the common goals of 
European Regional Policy have been articulated by Community as well as 
national actors. 
 
Finally, we argue that this shift in paradigms reveals something about how ideas 
affect policy outcomes, as well as how institutions such as that of the Regional 
Policy, can be described as being in a constant search for a raison d’être. If only 
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observing the institution as the sum of actors’ preferences, the ideas that guide the 
development of the institution are neglected, and in this case, it would only be 
relevant to describe the minor changes in how the policy is organized. Here, we 
have studied what broader goals are set for the policy, and thereby we get an 
impression of what goals are possible, and not less, what goals will be possible to 
attain in the future with the help of this particular institution. Thus, we also 
conclude, that the Regional Policy institution is rather constant and unchangeable, 
insofar as it is able to find a purpose with its existence; the goal of the institution 
thereby is to define itself in relation to ever-changing ideational paradigms. 
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CHAPTER 8 – PATH-DEPENDENCY ANALYSIS 
 
In relation to the conclusions made in the analyses, the notion of path 
dependency can be applied in order to gain an understanding of how 
stable the institutional mechanisms of the Regional Policy are. 
One obstacle in order to evaluate the degree of stability of EUs Regional 
Policy, however, is the fact that the two distinct frameworks of RC-
institutionalism and SC-institutionalism respectively, have different 
perceptions of what makes up an institution, and how an institution 
works. As already discussed in Chapter 5, these differences are in part 
based upon the fact that the ’ideas’ in RC-institutionalism are bracketed 
and exogenized, while in SC-institutionalism ideas are investigated and 
examined. The opposite could be said with regard to the concept of 
institutional rules and regulations, which in the analysis based upon 
sociological institutionalism plays a somehow understated role in relation 
to paradigms and programs that are elaborated upon and used as cursors 
for what path the institution is moving along ideationally. 
This epistemological difference thus gives a broader understanding 
of both concepts, when using the two approaches complementarily. 
Having carefully analysed the interaction of actors, ideas and 
institutions constituting and sustaining the regional policy, we now 
return to the point of origin, the historical institutionalism, which we 
will deploy in order to asses the overall stability of the institutional 
arrangements. Stability is important when it comes to predicting 
which further course (or path) the regional policy will take, based on 
the strengths and weaknesses it embodies at its present state. 
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A central point to the RCI analysis is the steady formation of a 
purpose into what started as a simple mechanism of redistribution 
(in order to compensate the UK for entering the Union) and has 
turned into a fundamental tool, connected to the different problems 
associated with the enlargements and qualitative deepening of the 
Union. The notion of regarding the regional policy as a mere 
instrument of redistribution, may have been more or less correct in 
1975, but has since then gradually become so embedded that the role 
of the regional policy is rather conditional for enlargement, than 
complementary - the RCI analysis has demonstrated how the 
regional policy rests on a complex set of institutional rules and how 
new actors may contest the rules, if their interest aren’t take into 
account. The accumulated legitimacy may secure the existence of the 
regional policy, but it does not come without a cost; the transaction 
costs related to shifting from one objective to another, is high (e.g. 
Cohesion in 1989), as funds - once distributed to solve a certain 
problem in specific member states - are difficult to re-attain, 
proportionally increasing the expenses related to the program. 
 
The tangible content of the policy is considerably more unsteady, for 
two reasons; it is subject to a constant struggle between the member 
states and the commission, wanting more or less strict control and 
interference from the community level. The other source of 
instability stems from the contestation between new and old 
objectives (e.g. Eastern Enlargement or Maarstricht) fuelling the row 
of who should ultimately benefit from this arrangement. 
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The commission has played a major role in introducing principles to 
secure the most effective outcome, though this role was overdone in 
a clearly unwanted, almost paternalistic manner. Still, the principles 
have persisted over time, suggesting that the supranational 
institution may have an impact on the development of the policy. 
Some characteristic concepts are so embedded, that they may appear 
too obvious to be noticed; such as the decision of using regions as 
basis for redistribution as opposed to other geographical units or 
categories. This institutionalised rule are of such a permanency that 
it is dubious that it may be contested, let alone noticed. It resembles a 
less noticed principles, just as those mentioned above, but 
nevertheless a stable one. Furthermore, the budget, having 
stagnated, but never decreased, demonstrates the permanency of the 
regional policy, as it bears witness of a collective will to solve 
problems on a common basis, though some dispute may exist 
regarding the nature of these problems.  
 
The accession of 10 new countries into the union clearly represents a 
problem compared with the historical traditions of expanding the 
budget following an enlargement, due to the vast differences 
between new and old countries. The point made above considering 
common solutions to problems is well illustrated by the SC analysis 
concerning the most current development of the regional policy. 
 
From the ideational point of view, stability occurs when a commonly 
articulated problem is addressed by a solution that is coherent with 
the current paradigm and is framed in order to comply with the 
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public sentiment. This situation occurred in relation to the uprise of 
the Cohesion paradigm, and has occurred once more in relation to 
the shift of paradigms towards the Lisbon paradigm. The current 
situation could be said to be more stable than under the Cohesion 
paradigm, because factors can be pointed out, that emphasize that 
the current public sentiment is more coherent with the Lisbon 
paradigm, than it was when the Cohesion paradigm had its glory 
days, because the Cohesion paradigm all things apart was subject to 
a greater degree of framing in order to gain legitimacy. This point is 
further backed by the latest undertaking of making this policy visible 
to the European population, through a distinct indication on every 
project involving community funding. 
Drawing this conclusion leads to the fact that maybe ideas or paradigms 
can be easily changed, due to a simple shift in focus; in this analysis, we 
conclude, that the Regional Policy has changed its focus due to exogenous 
factors related to tendencies of globalization, in addition to internal 
changes caused by the Eastern enlargement, and a concurrence of the 
public sentiment and the existing community paradigm based upon 
mechanisms of liberalization and deregulation. 
 
This paradigm shift illustrates well the assumption that the institution in 
terms of being a solution to collectively recognised problems is a rather 
stable variable, though the context in which it is embedded has an ever-
changing nature. When operating with the terminology of solutions and 
problems, it becomes evident, that the Regional Policy institution serves as 
a solution, but the commonly articulated problem has changed, and thus 
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the institution, in order to secure its raison d’être, has to customize the 
solution it can provide, to the new problems or goals.  
 
One important point is, that even though it can be said that the Lisbon 
paradigm presents new prospects for the Regional Policy and the Union as 
such, in practice the Regional Policy institution has not changed its ways 
of dealing with its functions markedly - at least not yet. 
 
A focal point of the two separate analyses has been the role of 
compensation.  
The compensation as used in the RCI analysis derives from a 
combination of poorly designed institutional rules during the 
enactment of the policy, and partly from the desire of decisive actors 
(member states) to retain control over the funds without external 
interference. The compensational thought pervades the history of the 
regional policy, and though its exact meaning may have changed, 
there are several examples of different bargains where compensation 
has played a central part; the already mentioned British accession, 
where the transfer of funds concerned an budgetary dispute between 
Britain and (mostly) France (with an element which was rooted in an 
idea of equality concerning who should pay or gain), the 
Mediterranean enlargement, in which the Iberian nations were 
bribed in order to endure the hardships of EU membership in terms 
of economic competition and political reforms; and finally the 
establishment of a pre-accession fund, the purpose of which was to 
encourage the Eastern European countries to adapt to the Western 
European standards. The last interpretation reflects the previous 
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mentioned shift in orientation of actors, from being a concept 
implying shortsighted hard-core interstate bargains to covering over 
the adoption of a complex policy formulated upon ideological 
considerations.  
 
The notion of compensation as well serves as a stabilizing factor for the 
Regional Policy. From an ideational point of view, this can be ascribed to 
the fact that the element of compensation has been a foreground element 
in the institution across different paradigms, and thus different meanings 
are embedded in this - this is not an argument that a concept serves as a 
stabilizing factor because it encompasses different meanings, but rather 
because the fundamental meaning of compensation; a trade-off made in 
order to make up for consequences generating from endogenously or 
exogenously created factors, has turned out to be a recurrent element in 
the development of Regional Policy. 
In this way, compensation becomes an unavoidably fix point for policy 
makers, and serves as a kind of ideational path dependence, at all times 
paving the road for what possibilities are at hand politically.    
What is changing then, on the other hand, is the meaning of compensation 
- this is related to the increasing expectations towards what problems the 
Union should be able to address. Currently, the Regional Policy is affected 
by these growing expectations, because its functionality depends on what 
kind of compensation it can offer.  
Thus, describing the Regional Policy field as ‘just’ a question of 
compensation is not very revealing, since compensation appears in many 
different shapes - from pure intergovernmental package deals, to long-
term promises of growth and jobs, creating and maintaining a shared 
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normative assumption about what constitutes the common idea of the 
institution.   
The most striking difference in the third kind of compensation described 
in the analysis, is that it symbolizes a ‘compensation for everybody’, 
meaning that the goals that are set up with the Lisbon strategy benefit the 
Union as a whole, and are not concentrated at diminishing disparities or 
creating benefits for the least developed regions as such. This could 
represent a kind of lock-in situation, because it is difficult to choose a 
different path, when the path already taken benefits the strong majority. In 
this context, The Lisbon strategy may be seen as a radical reformulation of 
the basic principles sustaining the regional policy that could have a major 
impact on the future course of this policy. By focusing on a new set of 
goals the traditional disputes considering plans of distribution can thus be 
evaded, as this aspect does not constitute a fundamental key in the 
paradigm, as the focus is shifted toward the outcome of the overall policy 
instead, making efficiency an arbitrary neutral parameter of the 
distributional issue.  
This fairly optimistic picture does, however, hold some flaws: The 
lacking financial perspective may just turn out to be the greatest 
hurddle, as the Lisbon strategy comes without any additional funds, 
thus disturbing the already existing distributional bargains. In 
addition to this, the group of member states are joined by a troupe of 
actors, which stands to loose nothing by obstructing the existing 
deal.  
The final conclusions lead us to suggest a possible institutional 
reform of the regional policy. This prediction is based on the 
anticipated distributional concerns of the new member states, the 
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identified paradigmatic change and the perpetually deeply 
embedded bias toward legitimising the policy in terms of 
representing a solution to relevant problems. 
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CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSION_____________________ 
 
How do institutional arrangements affect the development of EU’s 
regional policy, and what is its future prospects? 
 
In the preceding analysis of the development of EU’s Regional Policy, we 
have examined the institutional mechanisms that have been the driving 
factors in the way this policy area has evolved over time. These have been 
characterized through a study of the institutional creation phase of the 
Regional Policy and the conditions that existed at the time, which have 
had an impact on the subsequent operational phase and thereby, on how 
the actors choose to act in relation to their initial bargaining position. 
Explaining the creation of this institution, we point to the factor of 
‘compensation’, meaning that, first of all, in order to accept a financial 
redistribution mechanism, Member States need reassurance that they will 
at least get something in return; and secondly, that in order for some less- 
integrated Member States to be able to compete with other Member States 
in the Internal Market, an economic accompanying measure is necessary. 
 
In a calculus perspective, the institution retains its stability through the 
consent of the participating actors. This holds true as long as the 
institutional configuration reflects the participating actors’ interests and 
thus helps them realize their preferences. Though more or less outspoken 
weaknesses can be identified in both enacting phases, suggesting the lack 
of consent about the basic ideology, each creation phase has been decisive 
in the further development of the policy. 
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The effect of the institutional arrangement over time has clearly forced the 
actors to adopt comparatively more longsighted strategies in order to alter 
the institutional settings, though distributive concerns have not been 
completely subdued as they submerge from time to time.  
This orientation has been accelerated by the interference of the 
Commission, which in pursuance of its own preference, made a fruitless 
attempt to centralize the political competence by itself.  
 
Further, we have identified elements in the institutional arrangement, 
which have worked as stabilizing factors in the development.  
First of all, the Commission has showed to be a crucial part of the process 
of bringing meaning to the institution; in the beginning, the Commission 
articulated a greater purpose for the Regional Policy than the simple 
reflection of intergovernmental trade-offs, and this resulted in what could 
be called the Cohesion paradigm, where a policy was shaped with the aim 
of reducing disparities in a newly enlarged Union. We have shown how 
the Commission acted as more than the administrator of the ceded 
sovereignty and actually initiated a qualitative improvement of the 
Regional Policy in terms of funding, institutional rules and scope of the 
policy. 
A second factor is the notion of ‘visibility’, which assures a purpose with 
the policy, in that the actual projects of Regional Policy become visible to 
the citizens, and thus helps the Union as a whole in gaining legitimacy.  
Thirdly, the principle of ‘additionality’ illustrates how the Regional Policy 
has continuously had as its purpose to constitute a shared policy rather 
than a simple financial mechanism. Though this principle has been 
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contested and attempted neutralised, it has persisted and does still 
constitute a fundamental principle. 
 
These factors has a dual impact on Regional Policy; while they at one time 
constrain and frame the institutionalistic development into one definite 
course, they are at the same time stabilizing factors sustaining the 
formation of a raison d’être for the Regional Policy, hereby stressing the 
permanency of the current arrangement.   
However, in a changing context, the institution has to actively prove its 
right to exist - the Regional Policy was exposed to this when a shift of 
paradigms occurred in relation to the approval of the Lisbon Strategy.  
Hereby, a new kind of compensation has been formulated; instead of 
compensating for internally created consequences, the Regional Policy, in 
adhering to the Lisbon goals, becomes part of a strategy aimed at 
increasing competitiveness and growth, and thereby strengthening the 
Union against the consequences spurred by external factors in the shape of 
globalisation. 
 
The purpose of tackling the consequences of enlargements has later turned 
out to be a decisive factor in the shift of paradigm towards what can be 
called the Lisbon paradigm, since the Eastern enlargement of the Union 
poses great distributive problems, that the old Member States are not 
willing to address. Hence, the latest enlargement might turn out to have 
been the epitaph for the Cohesion paradigm. 
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Having determined the state of the Regional Policy as being rather stable 
in its most basic aspect of being a solution to contemporary challenges, 
some uncertainty exists concerning the persistence of its actual content. 
In evaluating the prospects for the Regional Policy in the future, an overall 
schism appears; the institutional mechanisms described above on one 
hand explain that the institution is rather stable, while it is the context in 
which it is placed that is changing. This assumption leads to the 
conclusion that Regional Policy, as we know it today, with its basic 
principles will remain, despite the need to customize it so that it coheres 
with commonly articulated problems and goals.  Thus, the institution is in 
a constant search for a raison d’être.            
On the other hand, interpreting ideas as having an effect on policy 
outcomes, it is evident that the approval of the Lisbon Strategy - in 
reflecting what could be called an ideational equilibrium, - first of all 
reflects what goals the actors wish to achieve, and secondly, illustrates a 
situation where it is only a question of time before the distributional 
aspects of the paradigm are agreed upon. However, the result of such a 
creation phase, and to what degree it is coherent with the goals of the 
Lisbon Strategy, will indeed depend on the degree to which member states 
accept the kind of long-term compensation provided by the Lisbon 
Strategy  - and to what degree the old kind of compensation in form of 
side-payments (and solidarity) is still dominant among the executive 
actors. Such an agreement might not be attainable, if the distributional 
concerns are too steep. 
The question of whether the Regional Policy will continue to exist in its 
present form, or whether it will undergo a third reform relies on several 
factors, here among the distributional aspect, the strength of the 
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Commission, the consent between the member states, and the Eastern 
newcomers. But what is more, an overarching factor on the further 
development lies with the ability of this institution to place itself 
meaningfully in a new and different context, thereby ensuring a path 
towards the future. 
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Glossary 
 
 
Actors: Institutions or member states acting in the institutions 
 
Additionality: Community action is meant as a complement or contribution 
to national initiatives and must not replace these 
   
Cohesion-policy: Refers to a number of EU-objectives, e.g. economic growth, 
competitiveness, employment etc. that are financial supported by the Union.    
 
Concentration: Refers to a concentration of the existing policies by the reform in 
1988, to create more efficiency to the Structural Funds 
  
Creationphase: A central concept Lindner and Rittbergers theory, see 4.3.2 p. 47 
 
DG Regio/DG XVI: The EU-institution with the responsibility of administering 
the Regional Policy. 
 
HI: Historical Institutionalism 
  
Institution:  The term is used to address both formal and abstract arrangement, 
see chapter four for further   
 
Path dependency: a historical choice, shaping and influencing future choices  
 
Paradigm: underlying theoretical and ontological assumptions about how the 
world works. See4.4.2  
 
    
Polity idea: Normative ideas about a certain policy should be. See 4.3.1 
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Programming: The organising, decision-making and financing process carried 
out in a number of stages to implement on a multi-annual basis in a joint action 
between the Community and the  
 
Member States: Depending of time, referring to the 6, 9, 12, 15 or 25 members 
of the European Union   
 
Operationphase: concept of the RCI, referring to the time after the enactment of 
an institution . See 4.3.2 
 
Program ideas: Ideas containing solutions to specific problems. See 4.2.2  
 
RCI: Rational choice institutionalism. See 4.3 
 
Regional policy: Refers to activities undertaking by the union in order to reduce 
disparities  
 
Rule contestation: Refers to certain behaviour by actors in the RCI analysis. See 
4.3.4  
 
SI: Sociological institutionalism. See 4.4 
 
Structural Policy: A term referring to the regional policy after the reform of 
1989  
 
Structural Funds: A term referring to the four European funds. See 1.3    
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Appendix A: Interview-guide 
 
 
Introduction 
o Personal background and experience in working with the Structural Funds. 
o Personal perception of the overall idea or ideologi with the Funds. 
 
 
The historical background (possible topics, depends on, on what the emphasis is 
put in answer to previous question) 
o What consequenses have followed due to the enlargements of the Union 
(especially the Mediterranean and Eastern enlargement)? 
o How are the political positions of the new member states different, and 
how does this affect the Regional Policy? 
 
 
Aktørernes roller over tid 
o What turning points can be identified regarding changes in the balance of 
power between the key institutions? 
- When have they taken place? 
- How often? 
- How fundamental have they been regarding the further development of 
the funds? 
 
o What is your perception of the role of the member states in the 
development of the funds? 
- Do they have different agendas respectively, can you point to specific 
groupings within the Council? 
- Do they have a different agenda than the Commission – and in what 
respect? 
 
o To what extent do the member states represent themselves and to what 
extent do they represent multiple regions – and how does this affect or 
complicate the bargains? 
 
o What is your perception of the role of the Commission in the development 
of the funds? 
- Is the Commission the one institution with an ideologic or macro-
perspective on the policies? 
 
 
Idéen bag over tid 
o To what degree have former budget periods had an influence on the design 
of the structural and cohesion policies of today? 
 
o To what degree has the specified goals and objectives of the funds 
changed over time – and how? 
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o Have different policy alternatives to the current design of the funds had 
any impact on the way the funds have developed? 
- What kinds of alternatives? 
- How prominent have the ideological discussions been regarding the 
future of the funds? 
 
o How and to what extent have the structural and cohesion policies changed 
in the time after the Delors-Commissions? 
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
